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LESSONS FROM QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS ON  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE, RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article presents original data and analysis addressing an 
understudied force in corporate America: the most patient and 
focused shareholders. Great attention has been devoted to short-
term trading on the one hand and diversified index funds on the 
other,1 but scant attention has been focused on long-term 
concentrated investors. The George Washington University has 
been redressing this problem through a research initiative focused 
on such buy-and-hold stock pickers, whom Warren Buffett long ago 
dubbed “quality shareholders.”2 GW’s Quality Shareholders 
Initiative3 (“QSI”) is pleased to present highlights of the initial 
installment of this work in this Article in the Business and Finance 
Law Review at the George Washington University’s Center for Law, 
Economics, and Finance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Our original motivation for the QSI arose from the growing size and 
power of institutional investors, among the most important contemporary 
trends in American corporate life. Lively debates contest whether such 
powerful investors have the right vision or conviction to faithfully discharge 
the trust so many Americans have placed in them.4 On vision, participants 
have long debated whether investors, especially activists, are too short-term 
oriented to enable managers and markets to maintain a long-term view.5 On 
conviction, debaters ask whether certain kinds of investors, particularly 
passive indexers, have sufficient incentives to actively monitor managers to 
promote performance and accountability.6    
 These are vital discussions in corporate America, implicating 
fundamental questions of the balance of power between directors and 
shareholders as well as among shareholders. As such, they stoke numerous 
sub-debates on every aspect of corporate governance, such as board 
structures, director-officer relationships, shareholder rights, and corporate 
purpose—all with wide-ranging effects on the national economy.7 Although 
such debates are sophisticated, increasingly data-driven, and involve 
overlapping participants, they suffer from a false binary: the horizon debate 
juxtaposes short-term against long-term but mutes conviction, while the 
conviction debate juxtaposes passive against active investment styles but 
mutes horizon.  
 In fact, however, while time horizon and relative conviction are 
important, neither alone captures the nuanced reality of investor behavior 
which involves both features simultaneously. The QSI incorporates such 
concurrent analysis of horizon and conviction by incorporating both as 
embodied in quality shareholders (“QSs”). 
 While contemporary data suggest that a large plurality of 
institutional shareholders qualify as short-term and another plurality as 
indexers, the QS cohort remains a significant force in market and corporate 
behavior. It should accordingly be given an important place in debates over 
horizon and conviction—as well as all areas concerning shareholder voice. 
 
4 See, e.g., Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth of the Ideal Investor, 41 SEATTLE L. REV. 425 
(2018). 
5 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius 
Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 
41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 545, 572-573 (2016). 
6 See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate 
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019). 
7 E.g., John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of 
Twelve (Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), www.ssrn.com/abstract=3247337. 
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The QSI’s efforts in this regard began with the book, Quality Shareholders, 
outlining the motivation, history and preliminary data on the cohort and the 
companies and practices that attract them.8 A series of journal articles 
followed.   
The first made the case to empower QSs9 as a contribution to the 
broader debate about the optimal general distribution of corporate power 
between managers on the one hand and all shareholders as a group on the 
other.10  The second explored a dozen corporate policies that attract QSs, 
adding to the literature on how companies shape their shareholder base.11 
The third elaborated a proposal for a separate precatory vote of QSs as a class 
when boards propose actions otherwise requiring or warranting a general 
shareholder vote, such as where by custom a vote of the minority 
shareholders is held.12 While these publications were being produced, QSI’s 
research continued to search for factors that attract or repel shareholders to 
particular companies. 
 Ongoing empirical research generally involves comparing the QSI 
ranking of companies by QS density with various rankings of companies and 
their policies. For instance, QSI has considered correlations between QS 
density and corporate statements of purpose, capital allocation prowess, 
reputation for trustworthiness, board structure and diversity, shareholder 
voting rights, corporate culture, and brand strength.13 The data tend to 
challenge conventional wisdom on many practices, suggesting that the views 
of QSs differ from those held by many in the governance establishment.  
All of this research showcased by the QSI is propitious as new 
research casts doubt on the reliability of databases long-used to debate 
corporate governance.14 For at least two decades, such debates have been 
shaped by a body of empirical work led by that of finance professors 
Gompers, Ishi and Metrick.15 Using data created by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC, now part of Institutional Shareholder 
Services or ISS), they found that investors generally fare far better investing 
 
8 LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS: HOW THE BEST MANAGERS 
ATTRACT AND KEEP THEM (2020). 
9 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders, 46 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1 (2020). 
10 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); 
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L. J. 
1554 (2015). 
11 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cultivating Quality: Time to Revise and Update the 
Shareholder Cultivation Literature, 15 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 85 (2021). 
12 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Ask the Smart Money: Shareholder Votes by a "Majority of 
the Quality Shareholders", 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 1 (2021). 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 Jens Frankenreiter, et al., Cleaning Corporate Governance, (U. Pa. L. Rev., Working 
Paper No. 738/2021) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796628.  
15 Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 
125-29 (2003). 
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in “democratic” than “despotic” companies. Dubbed the G-Index, 
researchers proliferated numerous variations using similar datasets.16 
Influential advisors to large institutional investors, such as ISS and MSCI, 
commercialized recommendations based on such data.  
But according to a major study by law professors Jens Frankenreiter, 
Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, and Eric Talley, this research contains many 
errors.17 Coders misinterpreted source material on some basic features, such 
as whether a company had dual class shares, a staggered board, or 
supermajority voting.18 Among dramatic effects of correcting for these errors 
erases, most of any return premium to democratic compared to despotic 
companies.19 
The new study and database promise better understanding for 
investors on key topics in corporate governance. There are many hypotheses 
to be tested, including those surfaced by the QSI.  For example, the QSI data 
suggests governance provisions operate differently in varying contexts, so 
that what’s good for one company is bad for another.  It also suggests that 
many factors well beyond those treated as central in recent decades matter 
more. If the Frankenreiter study creates a fresh slate for corporate 
governance debates, then the QSI research offers a timely contribution to the 
new direction of this research.  
In this Article, we summarize some aspects of the previously 
reported research and collate the many hypotheses and correlation test results 
applied since the most recent publications. This draws together parts of the 
book, research articles and columns.   
Part I reviews the literature on segmenting a shareholder base, along 
with observations on debate over whether any of various active investment 
strategies, such as those embedded in QSI, are capable of outperforming 
passive indexing on a systemic basis. Part II reports on the many different 
research methods that can be used to identify QSs and the companies that 
attract them. Dozens of techniques are presented, culled from both existing 
secondary sources as well as original QSI data crunching. Notably, the multi-
pronged effort tends to converge in identifying the same investors and 
companies across different sources and measures. Part III, the heart of the 
Article, presents a series of tests for the correlation between a variety of 
corporate practices and the attraction of QSs. This contributes a fresh view 
on many overlooked or underappreciated topics.  
 
I. THE QUALITY SHAREHOLDER SEGMENT 
 
 As background, this Part offers a definition of quality shareholders 
and identifies contrasting cohorts. It then briskly reviews some features of 
 
16 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered 
Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 132-135 (2016). 
17 See Frankenreiter, et al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 3). 
18 Id. (manuscript at 33). 
19 Id. (manuscript at 39). 
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the QS cohort along with highlights of ongoing debate in the financial 
community about whether such a strategy can be viable in terms of 
shareholder returns. Such preliminary framing will set the stage for Part II’s 
reports on methods of identifying QS and Part III’s engagement with what 
they prioritize.  
A. Shareholder Quadrants 
 This research first delineates multiple shareholder types based on 
both horizon and conviction.  To visualize this, shareholder cohorts can be 
identified using a 2 x 2 diagram arraying investment conviction across the 
top and investment horizon down the side. The result reveals combinations 




INVESTMENT CONVICTION  
    Lower Higher 
INVESTMENT  
HORIZON 
Shorter Transients   Activists   
Longer Indexers   Quality   
 Table I.1: The 2 x 2 Diagram 
 To animate the approach, descriptive names are assigned: transients 
to shorter-term/diversifiers; indexers to longer-term diversifiers; activists to 
shorter-term concentrators; and quality to longer-term concentrators. 
Investment conviction is measured by the degree of an investor’s portfolio 
diversification versus concentration, with lower conviction meaning the 
most diversified portfolio—epitomized by index funds. Investment horizon 
is measured by the investor’s average holding period in its investments. 
 Delineating the different criteria enables consideration of the trade-
offs. That will help managers attract shareholders they desire and 
policymakers tailor public policy, in each case ideally towards long-term and 
informed investors.     
  The stakes are high, as these debates touch fundamental issues in 
corporate governance. The rise of institutional investors raised the volume 
of shareholder voices on a wide range of matters, from director elections to 
say on executive pay and influence on corporate proposals spanning from 
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climate change and gender diversity to strategic direction and corporate 
priorities.20    
B. QS Performance 
 This Article does not investigate or make claims concerning 
investment strategy or portfolio construction, nor contend that QSs 
systemically achieve superior investment results.  Accordingly, no data have 
been sought or presented that would support such assertions. However, such 
topics are inevitably raised when considering the QS approach of patient 
focus, compared to short-term trading, a pure index, or any other of 
innumerable investing styles.  Some brief probing of the topic has therefore 
been done and reported.  
 At the most general level, ongoing debate in the literature and 
practice on investing rages around whether stock indexing or stock picking 
is a superior strategy, often delineating further into types of broad indexes 
(by size, sector, or geography) with stock pickers competing against that 
benchmark.21 A foundational contribution to that debate is a 1997 article by 
Mark Carhart, then a professor of finance at the University of Southern 
California, finding no evidence of successful mutual fund stock pickers.22  
 Ensuing research contributed to what became conventional wisdom, 
such as: average active funds underperform the market after fees;23 top fund 
performance doesn’t persist;24 and, while some managers are skilled, few 
deliver on that value for customers after fees.25 Yet debate continues—and 
 
20 See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Georgia State 
University Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk Workshop: Institutional Investors: 
Power and Responsibility (April 19, 2013) (finding that institutional investors have a voice 
when it comes to “the quality and diversity of Boards of Directors, as well as compensation 
structures and concerns about the runaway growth in executive pay”); Morgan LaManna & 
Rob Berridge, Acting on the Climate Crisis, 8 PROXY MONTHLY 8, 8 (2021), 
https://www.proxyinsight.com/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2021/08/Proxy-Monthly-
July-2021.pdf (“[i]n this record-setting proxy season, investors won majority votes on 14 
climate-related shareholder proposals in both the U.S. and Canada, more than double last 
year’s winning votes.”); Lyuba Golster et al., Heads-Up for the 2021 Proxy Season: Focus 
on Diversity Disclosure, WEIL GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES WATCH (March 22, 2021), 
https://governance.weil.com/proxy-season-updates/heads-up-for-the-2021-proxy-season-
focus-on-diversity-disclosure/ (“For the 2021 proxy season thus far, shareholder proponents 
have submitted more than 60 proposals on diversity, racial justice and human capital issues 
more broadly, including proposals asking companies to prepare a diversity and inclusion 
report.”). 
21 See Martijn Cremers, Jon Fulkerson & Timothy B. Riley, Challenging the Conventional 
Wisdom on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature on 
Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 75 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 8, 21 (2019). 
22 Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 57 (1997) 
(finding that the empirical evidence did “not support the existence of skilled or informed 
mutual fund portfolio managers”); see also Michael Jensen, The Performance of Mutual 
Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. FIN. 389, 415 (1968). 
23 William Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, 47 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 7, 7 (1991). 
24 See Carhart, supra note 22, at 72. 
25 Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund 
Performance, 65 J. FIN. 1915, 1916 (2010). 
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Buffett won a famous bet siding with indexers over hedge funds—at least 
those charging particularly high fees.26 Multiple editions of best-selling 
books continue to showcase dueling philosophies in academia: University of 
Pennsylvania finance professor Jeremy Siegel has repeatedly shown that 
buy-and-hold works,27 while Princeton University finance professor Burton 
Malkiel continues to release new editions of the book that legitimized 
indexing as a strategy.28  
But changes in shareholder demographics during the past two 
decades, combined with increased competition and lower fees, produced a 
new strand of research challenging these conventional views. For instance, 
there is evidence that the average active fund does outperform an equivalent 
index;29 some top-performance records do persist;30 and a sizable cohort of 
managers with particular traits demonstrate skill that covers their fees.31 As 
University of Notre Dame finance professor Martijn Cremers suggests in his 
comprehensive review of contemporary research, among those traits are 
conviction and patience.32 Those are the defining traits of QSs. 
 Concerning particular investor performance, many different ratings 
exist such as Morningstar, Lipper, Zacks, TheStreet.com and Standard & 
Poor’s.33 These organizations segment investors into numerous categories 
 
26 In 2008, Buffett bet a hedge fund manager the S&P 500 would, over the ensuing ten 
years, outperform, after fees, any hedge fund portfolio the manager cared to assemble. See 
BUFFETT & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2, at 180-183. The manager assembled a fund of 
funds, a configuration charging multiple layers of high fees.  During the first three years, the 
S&P lagged the fund, but by bet’s end, the S&P won. If many took from the bet the lesson 
that indexers are always superior to non-indexed investing, that is a mistake. The primary 
point was to stress that ordinary individuals are almost certainly better off, given the risks 
and fees, of staking their savings in index funds rather than entrusting it to high-cost hedge 
funds. 
27 See JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN 220 (5th ed. 2014); see also LOUIS 
ENGEL & HENRY R. HECHT, HOW TO BUY STOCKS 125 (8th ed. 1994). 
28 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 257 (12th ed. 2019). 
29 Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund 
Industry, 118 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 17 (2015); Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, 
Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 147, 162–64 (2017); Hyunglae Jeon, 
Jangkoo Kang & Changjun Lee, Precision About Manager Skill, Mutual Fund Flows, and 
Performance Persistence, 40 N. AM. J. ECON. FIN. 222, 236 (2017). 
30 See Nicolas Bollen & Jeffrey Busse, Short-term Persistence in Mutual Fund 
Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 571 (2004); Robert Kosowski, Allan Timmermann, 
Russ Wermers & Hal White, Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence 
from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551, 2593 (2006). 
31 Yakov Amihud & Ruslan Goyenko, Mutual Fund’s R2 as Predictor of Performance, 26 
REV. FIN. STUD. 667, 680 (2013); Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your 
Fund Manager? A New Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329, 3332 
(2009). 
32 Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment Skill 
of High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288, 289 (2016). 
33 See e.g., Ratings, S&P GLOBAL, 
https://disclosure.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/ratings-actions (last visited Sept. 11, 
2021); Best Investments, MORNINGSTAR, https://www.morningstar.com/best-investments 
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and subcategories such as sector (energy, technology etc.), style (value or 
growth), size (large, mid-cap, small), or time (a spectrum from one to 20 
years).34  Such lists include frequent references to many QSs identified as 
such in Part II, including such household names as Capital Group, Fidelity, 
Franklin Templeton, and T. Rowe Price.35  
C. QS Attractor Performance 
 It also appears to be the case that the companies in which QSs invest 
the most tend to outperform as well.  For instance, QSI’s database ranks a 
large sample (n=2070) of large companies according to their propensity to 
attract a high density of QS. First, we constructed a hypothetical portfolio of 
the QSDR top 20, equally weighted, and assumed invested from January 
2014 through July 2021. That portfolio, whose names appear in Table I.1, 
generated a 17.27% (CAGR, with dividends reinvested) compared to 
14.18% for the Vanguard 500 Index Investor.    
Roper Technologies, Inc.  
Selective Insurance Group, Inc.  
AptarGroup, Inc.  
Amphenol Corporation  
Dolby Laboratories  
Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. 
BlackRock, Inc. 
West Pharmaceutical Services, Inc. 
Stryker Corporation  
Public Storage  
AvalonBay Communities, Inc.  
Cincinnati Financial Corporation 
General Dynamics Corporation  
Lockheed Martin Corporation  
Balchem Corporation  
Gartner, Inc.  
Jack Henry & Associates, Inc.  
News Corporation 
Digital Realty Trust, Inc.  
Sensient Technologies 
Corporation 
Table I.2: The QSI-20 
 Second, we compared two portfolios over the QSDR study period 
(2014-2018): one comprised of the 25 companies attracting the highest 
density of QSs and the other of the 25 attracting the lowest density of QS.  
The high QS density portfolio outperformed the low QS density portfolio in 
each of those five years.36     
 
visited Sept 11, 2021); Zacks Rank, ZACKS  https://www.zacks.com/stocks/zacks-rank (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2021); Lippers Leaders, LIPPERS  
http://www.lipperleaders.com/QuickInfo.aspx?pid=Investors (last visited Sept 11, 2021); 
Top Rated, THESTREETS, https://www.thestreet.com/topics/mutual-funds/top-rated-mutual-
funds (last visited Sept. 11, 2021). 
34 See, e.g., Sector/Industry Research, S&P GLOBAL (last visited Sept. 11, 2021), 
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/sector/corporates/corporate-sector. 
35 See infra text accompanying notes 52-54. 
36 Performance is measured as the cumulative return, or total change in the price of the 
investment expressed as a percentage, on daily unadjusted historical closing prices from the 
first trading day in 2014 through the last trading day of 2018.   




Third, we compared the relative performance of the top 69 in QS 
density on that list. Those with higher QS density tend to outperform those 
with lower, true even for longer periods. Consider the performance 
distribution of QS attractors over the 10-year period from 2010 through mid-
2020. For comparison, during that period, the cumulative return of the S&P 
500 was 181.9% and of the Russell 3000 180.73%.  
In the following chart, such performance places both indices in the 
100–200% performance band (red bar). Of the top 69 QS attractors, sixty 
percent (41) outperformed while forty percent (28) underperformed. A 
hypothetical portfolio only with the top 69 QS attractors, each company 







1/2/2014 1/2/2015 1/2/2016 1/2/2017 1/2/2018
Portfolio Performance of Top 25 and Bottom 25 
(1/2/2014 - 12/31/2018) 
TOP25 BOTTOM25
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 We recognize that this is an extremely limited sample and aim to 
conduct further testing. Meanwhile, however, the results accord with 
anecdotal evidence and can be explained on rational grounds.37  So why 
might companies with higher densities of QSs perform better than rivals with 
lower-quality shareholder bases? Superior economics and related 
performance would certainly attract such shareholders, so that high QS 
density is a consequence rather than a cause of such a correlation.  
 But it also seems plausible that the existence of a high density of 
QSs confers a variety of competitive advantages on corporations that help 
explain such superiority. For instance, QSs give managers longer time 
horizons to execute on strategy than transients; cast more informed 
shareholder votes than indexers that may add value; and pursue engagement 
with managers that is more productive and patient than activists, including 
providing a brain trust to draw upon for board service and consultation.38  
 
II. IDENTIFYING QSS AND THEIR ATTRACTORS 
 
 In order to segment shareholders into these cohorts, it is necessary 
to apply both quantitative and qualitative analysis.   While elements of 
judgment and assumptions are required, they are supported by the data. We 
 
37 See Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment 
Skill of High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. OF FIN. ECON. 290, 304 
(2016) (providing anecdotal information about investors who would qualify as QSs, and the 
comparative success of their investment strategies).  
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are reminded of the quip of noted quality management expert, W. Edwards 
Deming: “Without data, you are just another person with an opinion.”39  
 The adage attributed to John Maynard Keynes is also apt: “it is better 
to be approximately right than precisely wrong.”40 This wisdom applies to 
any attempt to identify the QSs from among today’s vast universe of 
institutional investors. Reliable selections depend on both objective criteria 
and subjective calls.  The following is a summary of the approaches used in 
this research. 
  The primary selection criteria for this research are as follows: (1) 
QSs are shareholders that historically, over a multi-year period, have 
exhibited a consistent behavior of investing in high concentrations and for 
long holding periods; and (2) companies whose shareholder base is 
comprised of a high relative density of such shareholders. 
 Creating criteria to quantify shareholder cohorts raises challenges, 
like between what’s short- and long-term and what’s a diversified versus 
concentrated portfolio. While there are QSs under the tightest definitions of 
long-term and concentrated—say average holding periods of 8 years and no 
more than 20 stocks—today’s investment universe is so prone to both trading 
and indexing that the pool tails off quickly. To some, plausible criteria for 
quality might be as little as a 2-year holding period and 200 or fewer stocks.  
 Some large financial institutions might be classified in one category 
but have multiple funds within them better classified in another.  For 
example, Neuberger Berman as a firm in aggregate shows an index level of 
diversification yet offers many investors a selection of funds with managers 
who certainly count as QSs.41 Each fund within a family may warrant 
separate evaluation.  
 Also warranting separate evaluation are shareholders not required to 
publicly disclose their positions, unlike large institutions. These are 
individuals or small firms who shun the ubiquitous mutual funds in favor of 
selecting their own portfolio. They are clearly not indexers, though the exact 
distribution as transient versus QSs is hard to determine and may vary with 
different companies. One thing is clear: despite the rise of institutional equity 
 
39 Milo Jones & Phillipe Silzerbahn, A Brave New World of Data, FORBES (Sept 18, 2021 
6:04 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/silberzahnjones/2016/03/15/without-an-opinion-
youre-just-another-person-with-data/?sh=41c0bd8699fc. 
40 See Hans Nilsson, It is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong, European Council 
for an Energy Efficient Economy, https://www.eceee.org/all-news/columns/it-is-better-to-
be-roughly-right-than-precisely-wrong/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2021). 
41 Neuberger Berman Small Cap Growth Fund, NEUBERGER BERMAN, 
https://www.nb.com/en/us/products/mutual-funds/small-cap-growth-fund?nbmi=0954 (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2021) (showing a fund with high percentage of portfolio turnover); 
Neuberger Berman Intrinsic Value Fund, NEUBERGER BERMAN, 
https://www.nb.com/en/us/products/mutual-funds/intrinsic-value-fund?nbmi=1075 (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2021) (showing a fund with a lower-than-average percentage of portfolio 
turnover). 
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ownership in recent decades, individuals and families still own one-third of 
corporate equity—a formidable cohort.  
 Some shareholders are QSs to one company while being another’s 
indexer or transient: some shareholders may have a huge stake in one favored 
company held forever while the rest of the portfolio is either indexed or 
traded rapidly. For instance, First Manhattan is undoubtedly a QS of 
Berkshire Hathaway (at least 25% of its recent portfolio, since 1966) but not, 
say, a QS of Hostess Brands (it recently bought and sold a small stake within 
3 quarters).42 Likewise, even Numeric, an exquisite transient, has 2.5% of its 
portfolio in Facebook held since its 2013 IPO.43 
There are many ways to segment the shareholder universe to 
distinguish quality shareholders from the rest. Detailed in what follows are a 
dozen different techniques QSI has applied. Other databases and researchers 
may apply different tests and, depending on whether the research is 
proprietary or purely academic, may keep results confidential or publicize 
them. 
All provide reliable inputs and rankings of a large number of 
institutional shareholders that file periodic portfolio reports with the SEC. 
Each database differs slightly in the covered population, the criteria applied, 
and the resulting classification scheme. This variety provides a menu for 
interested constituents to choose from to meet varying objectives.    
 For an academic example, Professor Bushee’s academic database 
classifies investors into dedicated, transient and quasi-indexer, based on the 
combination of average holding periods and overall concentration level.44  In 
effect, “dedicated” is the functional equivalent of QS.  For a proprietary 
example, EQX also maintains the EQX database ranking investors by 
average relative holding periods and concentration levels, as well as the 
companies that attract them in high density.45   
 Other databases may focus on one or the other but not both.  An 
example focused on concentration is the active share measure of Professors 
Cremers and Pareek, focused exclusively on concentration.46 Measuring 
 
42 First Manhattan Company Top 13F Holdings, WHALEWISDOM, 
https://whalewisdom.com/filer/first-manhattan-co#tabholdings_tab_link (last visited Sept. 
17, 2021); Hostess Brands Inc A Owner History, FORMTHIRTEEN, 
https://formthirteen.com/securities/44109J106-hostess-brands-inc-a/history (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2021). 
43 Numeric Investors, Holdings Report (Form 13F) (Feb. 5, 2014); Man Group PLC, 
Holdings Report (Form 13F) (Aug. 16, 2021); Acquisition of Numeric by Man Group, MAN 
GROUP, https://www.man.com/acquisition-of-numeric (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) (showing 
that Numeric’s holdings are filed under Man Group’s 13F after Man Group Acquired 
Numeric in 2014).  
44 Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the Behavior 
of Institutional Investors, 16 J. APPLIED. CORP. FIN. 28, 29 (2004). 
45 EQX, https://www.eqxse.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2021) 
46 See Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment 
Skill of High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288, 291–
92 (2016). 
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portfolio construction on a 0-1 scale from pure index to pure concentration, 
active share has become a prominent metric to distinguish between purely 
passive asset managers and true stock pickers.47    
 It’s helpful to use multiple research methods as no single metric can 
incontestably identify the cohort of QSs, given the judgments necessary in 
defining both duration and concentration as well as the varying sources 
available to segment shareholders along these lines. Accordingly, the QSI 
has employed many different methods—and continues to do so. The 
following is a survey and summary. Despite the variety, however, or perhaps 
due to it, there is remarkable overlap in the populations that the various 
methods yield. Accordingly, taken together, there does seem to be a discrete 
population of QSs that warrant study.  
 Surveys.  One way to identify QSs, in general or at particular 
companies, is to survey leading investors. A similar method for identifying 
companies that succeed in attracting quality shareholders would survey 
investor relations professionals with analogous knowledge. The latter is an 
obvious winner for companies undertaking such an examination, whose in-
house staff is an excellent starting point.  
 The survey approach is endorsed in several prominent writings by 
and about outstanding investors, heavily oriented toward QSs. Examples 
include the celebrated 1984 Buffett article, The Superinvestors of Graham-
and-Doddsville, and a 2005 sequel by Columbia University law professor 
Louis Lowenstein—along with a comment on the latter by Seth Klarman of 
Baupost Group, as well as numerous other books profiling outstanding 










J. M. Keynes 
Charles Munger 






Table II.1: QSs in Literature/Surveys 
 Berkshire Based. Given Warren Buffett’s successful 50-year effort 
to attract QSs to Berkshire Hathaway, that company’s shareholder list is a 
 
47 Id.; Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/07/active-share.asp 
(last visited Sept. 17 2021). 
48 See Warren Buffett, The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville, HERMES, May 1985, 
at; Louis Lowenstein, Searching for Rational Investors in a Perfect Storm, 30 J. CORP. L. 
539, 542–43 (2005); Seth A. Klarman, A Response to Lowenstein’s Searching for Rational 
Investors in A Perfect Storm, 30 J. CORP. L.  561, 565 (2005); Bruce N. Greenwald, et al., 
VALUE INVESTING: FROM GRAHAM TO BUFFETT AND BEYOND 159, 211–24 (2001); see ALLEN 
C. BENELLO, MICHAEL VAN BIEMA & TOBIAS E. CARLISLE, CONCENTRATED INVESTING: 
STRATEGIES OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST CONCENTRATED VALUE INVESTORS 109–11 (2016); 
JOHN TRAIN, MONEY MASTERS OF OUR TIME 306 (2000). 
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good place to find QSs. Start with the most concentrated Berkshire 
shareholders—there are at least 250 with more than 5% of their portfolio 
staked in the company, almost all of which have held the stock for decades.49  
To make the search manageable and meaningful, select an 
appropriate sample or investment size, such as the 20 with the largest stakes 
or all those whose stakes exceed $250 million. Examine their portfolios to 
identify other companies they concentrate in for long periods.  Finally, 
examine those companies to identify other concentrated long-term 
shareholders. The result will be a credible group of both QSs and companies 
who attract them.  
Examples of concentrated and substantial long-term Berkshire 
shareholders appear in Table II.2. Some other companies in which such 




 Arlington Value 
 Check Capital 
 Consulta 
 Cortland Advisers 
 Davis Selected Advisers 
 Douglass Winthrop 








Lee Danner & Bass 
 Lourd Capital 
 Markel 
 Mar Vista 
 Ruane Cunniff  
 Wedgewood Partners 
 Weitz Investment 









Fairfax Financial  







Table II.3: Other Investees of Berkshire Hathaway QSs   
 
    Existing Empirical Research.  An additional resource is published 
empirical research. The methods can be adapted to suit particular companies, 
by features such as size or industry. Such research rarely lists particular 
shareholders by type, rather analyzing aggregate data to address broader 
questions. But there are exceptions, such as a Table II.4 of both QSs and 
transients in recent research about their different effects on given company 
 
49 See Quality Shareholders Initiative, Quality Shareholder Density Ranking (on file with 
the author and the QSI). 
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risk profiles and market pricing.50 The following chart presents each type 
alphabetically.  
 
Among Top Quality Among Top Transients 
Berkshire Hathaway 
Capital Research & Management 
Jennison Associates 
Fidelity Management & Research  
Harris Associates (Oakmark Funds) 
State Farm 









Table II.4: QSs and Transients in Empirical Research   
 Cremers and Pareek created a 13F-based data set of all institutional 
investors dating to 1980, presenting, quarter-by-quarter, each shareholder’s 
concentration (measured as deviation from the index, with the index equal to 
0.0) and average holding period.51 In this massive data base, the cutoff for 
the top quintiles were 0.9 for concentration and 2.0 years for holding 
periods.52  
 From the top quartile of both—excluding foundations and private 
equity funds holding one or a few stocks—one doing this analysis should 
choose a relevant time period, such as the most recent five-years, omit 
duplicate names, and rank the remaining names by frequency of quarters 
making the list. This process yielded a total of 195 names, a rich vein of QSs. 
There was substantial overlap in this cohort with that identified using the 




Bislett Mgmt.  
Dane Falb Stone 
D.F. Dent 
Fenimore  






W. H. Reaves 




50 See Paul Borochin & Jie Yang, The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm 
Valuation and Governance, J. FIN. ECON. 171, 175 (2017). The table highlighted the various 
QSs by portfolio size.  
51 Cremers & Pareek, supra note 37, at 289. 
52 Id. at 290. The median concentration level is 79%, with the authors classifying those 
below 60% as closet indexers. The median holding period is 1.166 years (14 months), with 
the bottom quintile breakpoint being .483 (7 months). Holding periods have been fairly 
stable over time, though increasing in recent years. Those with concentration scores above 
.96 are usually associated with special purposes, such as foundations whose portfolios are 
dominated by a single stock (Hershey Trust, Hewlett Foundation, Lilly Endowment); 
companies with large permanent stakes in publicly traded subsidiaries (Loews Corporation, 
Moody National Bank); and private equity firms with such transitional stakes (Apollo, Ares, 
Bain Capital, Thomas H. Lee Partners, General Atlantic, Pacific Financial).  
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Fiduciary Mgmt. Speece, Thorson Wintergreen Advisers 
Table II.5: QSs Derived from Cremers-Pareek Data   
 Resources. Several website services provide useful data. Rocket 
Financial digests quarterly updated 13F filings.53 The site presents 
shareholder lists and investor portfolios in columns of data that can be sorted 
in a variety of ways and/or downloaded to spreadsheets for further 
manipulation, including calculating concentration. The site tabulates 
quarterly filings over time to enable calculating holding periods as well.54  
 The FloatSpec website was made available to Initiative researchers 
during its incubation and before its developers sold it to PJT Partners. Upon 
entering company or fund names, the site presents brief profiles along with 
rankings, such as fund turnover and certain categories of shareholder type.55 
One extract ranked shareholders by a combination of their quartile rankings 
in terms of turnover and concentration.  There was substantial overlap in this 
cohort with that identified using both the Berkshire method and the 
















Lee, Danner & Bass 




Table II.6: QSs Derived from FloatSpec Data   
IHS Markit maintains a rich database of shareholders and their 
investees.56 It is broad in scope, scooping up not only 13F data but data from 
multiple other reliable sources.57 Using the database, we selected for 
investment managers with the lowest portfolio turnover as classified by the 
site and a concentration by ownership of 100 or fewer names. That resulted 
in a total of just 65 accounts, with the following 15 investing at least $1 
billion in equities.   
 
Alpine   Focused Investors   Marshfield Associates  
 
53  Rocket Financial News and Filings 13F, ROCKET FINANCIAL, 
http://www.rocketfinancial.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2021).  
54 Id. 
55  See Christopher Friend & Peter Heye, Do you know your Investors?, MEDIUM (Jan. 8, 
2018), https://medium.com/fintech-sandbox-the-weekly/do-you-know-your-investors-
ee08bbc8740f. 
56  See Institutional ownership data: Quantitative research results, HIS MARKIT 1, 1 (Jun. 
23, 2021), https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/institutional-ownership-data-quantitative-
research-results.html.  
57 See id. 
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Cacti    
Cantillon   
Check Capital 
Compass Capital  
FPR Partners  
Gardner Russo & Gardner  
Gillespie Robinson & Grim 
Loews Corp.   
McDonald Capital   
Saratoga Research  
Schwerin Boyle     
Standard General 
Table II.7A: QSs Derived from IHS Data   
 Trading Data. To proxy companies boasting patient shareholders, 
consider data relating either share trading volume to shares outstanding or 
dollar trading volume to market capitalization.  We did the latter using S&P 
Capital IQ data.58 We ran it for both smaller groups such as the S&P 500, 
larger groupings such as the Russell 3000, and even larger universes 
encompassing substantially all publicly traded companies. We examined 
results on different timelines, one, three, and five years.  
 These are the 40 or so companies from the S&P 500 with the lowest 
share turnover for the one-year period ending with the third quarter of 2018. 
These appear in Table II.7 (in order down the columns then across the rows). 
  
Berkshire Hathaway  
Alphabet (Google) 
BlackRock 
Johnson & Johnson 
The Coca-Cola Co. 
Walmart  




PNC Financial  
Air Products  
Procter & Gamble  
Charles Schwab  
Stryker  
Northrop Grumman  
Wells Fargo  
American Express  
Union Pacific  











General Dynamics  
Marsh & McLennan  
PPG Industries 
Lockheed Martin  
Bristol-Myers Squibb  
Microsoft  
Cisco Systems  
Danaher  
Intuit Inc. 
Table II.7: QSs Derived from Trading Data (S&P 500)  
From among the Russell 3000,59 Table II.8 presents selected names appeared 














Cimpress   
 
58 See Ownership, S&P GLOBAL, 
https://www.marketplace.spglobal.com/en/datasets/ownership-(20) (last visited Sep. 20, 
2021).   
59 See Membership list: Russell US Indexes, FTSE RUSSELL, 
https://content.ftserussell.com/sites/default/files/ru3000_membershiplist_20210628.pdf (last 
visited Sep. 21, 2020). 
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Table II.8: QSs Derived from Trading Data (Russell 3000)  
 Empirical Data Analytics. In empirical research of this Initiative, we 
identified those institutional investors with the highest conviction in their 
positions and greatest patience, using a multi-factor ranking model, and 
identified some of the companies in which that cohort most often invested.  
We examined the 20F filings of institutional investors registered/operating 
in the U.S. and/or Canada which made quarterly reporting during all quarters 
from 2014 to 2018, had a minimum $1.1B AUM,60 and a majority of whose 
investments were in corporate equity. We removed avowed indexers, 
activists, and private equity.   
 Concerning conviction, the model analyzed such factors as: (1) the 
percentage weight of a stock in the portfolio; (2) relative concentration levels 
of the portfolio; (3) average voting power of the portfolio in the companies 
of the stocks it holds; (4) number of stocks in the portfolio with significant 
ownership (>0.1% of market cap); and (5) total number of stocks in the 
portfolio. Relative patience was probed by such factors as: (1) the portfolio’s 
gross traded dollar-value compared to its AUM and (2) the rate and 
magnitude of change of a portfolio’s constituents, calculated by taking the 
periodic standard deviation and overall standard deviation of stocks in a 
portfolio.   
 The top 20 QSs are presented in Table II.9 (in order, down columns 





















Irdian Asset Management 
Table II.9: QSs Derived from QSI Empirical Analysis 
 Among portfolio positions representing at least 2% of each such 
QS’s portfolio, 300 different stocks appeared.  Of these, 20 appeared thrice 
or more as listed below and 38 appeared twice. Table II.10 presents a 
selection of those:  
 
60 While AUM data were not explicitly given, we defined an equation to compute the 
quarterly capital invested by each 13F filer.  Using the manager’s identification number and 
stock holdings information, we aggregated quarterly holdings (shares owned multiplied by 
stock price) of each manager to compute quarterly AUM. To manage the data, at some cost 
in size skewing, only managers with average annual AUM (sum of quarterly AUM in a 
specific year divided by 4 quarters) exceeding $1 billion were retained.   
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S&P Global  











Nine Times  
Alphabet 
   Table II.10: Common Investees of QSs 
 We also ranked a large sampling (2,070) of companies based on the 
extent to which their institutional investor base exhibits the traits of QSs, in 
terms of time-horizon and concentration, called the QS Density Ranking 
(QSDR).  The QSDR is a proxy of the degree to which companies attract a 
high density of QSs. It can be used to understand which corporate policies 
and practices are associated with a high density of QS. 
The QSDR can also be used to position companies boasting ownership by a 
particular QS in the context of the broader QS cohort. For instance, consider 
relating the foregoing list of companies in which the top 20 QSs tend to 
invest to the QSDR.   All eight held four or more times are in the top half of 
the QSDR; among those held thrice nearly half (5/11) are in the top quarter 
(Allergan is not in the QSDR); and 64% (7/11) are in the top quarter.  In the 
random sampling of those represented twice, 58% (7/12) are in the top 
quarter while 75% (9/12) are in the top half.  Such figures suggest that when 
leading QSs invest significantly in a particular company, it is likely that a 
larger cohort of QS accompanies them. 
 
* * * * * 
We continue to add data points in our effort to identify QSs and the 
companies that attract them. Results vary across databases and methods, 
naturally, but there is remarkable overlap in most cases that yields a fairly 
reliable picture of the shareholders that make up this cohort and the 
companies they prefer. Appendix A presents an aggregation of some of the 
leading names of QSs and their investees. 
 
III. POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
  QSI is investigating numerous strategies of shareholder engagement 
that might attract QSs.  Concerning specific corporate policies or practices, 
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we related publicly available data on various company practices to the QS 
density ranking of 2,070 companies based on their relative proportion of QSs 
(the “QSDR”).  
Specifically, focus is on the percentage of companies following (or 
not following) a given practice that appear high (or low) in the QSDR. For 
example, no association can be asserted if companies following (or not 
following) a given practice are evenly or haphazardly distributed across the 
2,070 companies in the QSDR; but if the practice group members skew 
mostly towards the high (say half are in the top decile) or low end of the 
pool, such an association can be asserted.  
 We have tested a dozen levers and report the results in what follows. 
The levers are clustered logically around four major themes in contemporary 
literature on corporate governance and related topics. These are corporate 
purpose, corporate culture, corporate governance, corporate boards and 
corporate reality.   
 Corporate purpose, a voguish topic in corporate law scholarship of 
recent years, sparked by the Business Roundtable statement and the rise of 
ESG—both of which are reassessed here in light of the views QSs.61 In 
particular, QSs embrace both the BRT and ESG ideas, but largely because 
they are conventional rather than accord with the more radical fanfare and 
rhetoric that has blanketed popular discourse.  
 Corporate culture is also in fashion among corporate law scholars, 
stoked by a rising preoccupation with compliance and regulatory oversight.62 
QSs are generally less enthusiastic about this development, tending to 
disfavor command and control cultures in favor of trust-based cultures 
characterized by decentralization and autonomy.  Lessons here counsel 
against zealotry around compliance cultures, as trust trumps it.  
 Corporate governance remains topic after bursting onto the 
corporate law professor agenda in the 1980s, and it continues to bend 
towards rigid formulaic and universal mandates rather than flexible, tailored 
firm-specific provisions for which corporate law became famous generations 
ago.63 QSs favor the latter and for good reason: there has always been doubt 
about whether “good governance” so defined translates into superior 
corporate performance.64   Recent scholarship, moreover, challenges the 
 
61 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Here’s evidence that putting customers and 
employees first turn out to be profitable for a company’s stockholders too, MARKETWATCH 
(Oct. 14, 2020, 8:12 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-evidence-that-putting-
customers-and-employees-first-turns-out-to-be-profitable-for-a-companys-stockholders-too-
2020-10-14?mod=lawrence-a.-cunningham_seemore; see Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Opinion: These savvy investors were ESG-friendly long before it was fashionable, 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 5, 2021, 2:51 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/quality-
shareholders-were-esg-friendly-long-before-it-was-fashionable-
11614800744?mod=lawrence-a.-cunningham. 
62 See Bryce Tingle, What Do we Really Know About Corporate Governance? A Review of 
the Empirical Research Since 2000, 59 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 292, 293 (2018). 
63 See Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate 
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1863 (2008). 
64 See Frankenreiter, et al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 55). 
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empirical basis for the status quo’s preference for prescription.65 The QSI 
contributions may therefore be particularly fruitful in this area.  
 Within corporate governance, a sub-set of important topics focuses 
on the board of directors, particularly their relative ownership and diversity. 
QSs value all three, it turns out, though somewhat differently than many.  For 
instance, many call for directors to own a little bit of stock which is often 
given to them as a grant or through an option.66 QSs prefer large ownership 
stakes bought with the directors’ own cash.67  On diversity, it has become the 
trend in recent years to push for racial and gender diversity on boards, 
including through statutes in California and disclose-or-explain rules on 
NASDAQ.68  QSs may or may not support such mandates, but there is 
evidence that they have supported more substantial results through volition 
rather than compulsion. 69 
 Finally, unlike the foregoing, are a collection of off the beaten path 
points that QSs regard as central yet mainstream discussion has neglected or 
muted. First up is capital allocation, competitive advantages, shareholder 
communications, and long CEO tenures.  
 
A. Corporate Purpose70 
In 2019, the Business Roundtable, an elite lobbying group of U.S. 
executives, adopted a statement of corporate purpose that some say puts the 
interests of workers and communities above those of shareholders.71 In this 
view, the Roundtable rejected shareholder-centered statements of corporate 
purpose, such as that of economist Milton Friedman, who wrote in 1970 that 
 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: 
Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1073 (2014). 
67 See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 56. 
68 S.B. 826, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); NASDAQ, RULE 5606 (2021). 
69 See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 137.  
70 This section comes from Cunningham’s Quality Investing columns in MarketWatch of 
October 14, 2020 and March 3, 2021. This section comes from Cunningham’s Quality 
Investing columns in MarketWatch of October 14, 2020 and March 3, 2021. See generally 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: These Savvy Investors Were ESG-Friendly Long 
Before It Was Fashionable, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 3, 2011, 2:45 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/quality-shareholders-were-esg-friendly-long-before-it-
was-fashionable-11614800744 (providing background information on ESG and their 
influence in attracting QSs); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: S&P 500 Corporate 
Boards Lack Diversity, but These Top Companies Are Leading Change — and the Stock 
Market Rewards Them, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2020, 9:38 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-500-corporate-boards-lack-diversity-but-these-top-
companies-are-leading-change-and-the-stock-market-rewards-them-2020-10-23 (providing 
background information on QSs and how diversity affects and intersects with corporations). 
71 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘an Economy 
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the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits for 
shareholders.72 
Heated debate has followed.73 Champions of corporate social 
responsibility herald the Roundtable’s statement, while critics claim it would 
impose public obligations on the private sector.74 Skeptics warn that having 
business leaders answering to many different constituents will impair 
corporate accountability.75   
“Yet there is a good case that there is less at stake than meets the 
eye”—and not because the exercise was for show, but because it states a 
reliable formula for corporate success. 76 And there is evidence that QSs tend 
to agree with the Business Roundtable’s statement.77  
Debate arises from the order of priorities in the Roundtable’s 
statement of corporate purpose: customers, employees, suppliers, and 
communities all come before stockholders, who are at the end.78 But while 
this may sound inverted, the truth is profits for shareholders are increased by 
 
72 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-- the Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-
responsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/5GYL-XA8L].  
73 See generally Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The 
Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363, 363-65 (2021) (providing an overview 
of “a high-profile public debate [that] is taking place over one of the oldest questions in 
corporate law, namely, ‘[f]or whom is the corporation managed?’”). 
74 See, e.g., Margaret Blair, Two Years After the Business Roundtable Statement: Pointing in 
the Right Direction, PROMARKET (Sept. 13, 2021), 
https://promarket.org/2021/09/13/business-roundtable-statement-right-direction-
corporations-behaving-badly/ (arguing the Business Roundtable statement was a baby step 
in the right direction because it has shifted dialogue to take into account stakeholders instead 
of just shareholders but that it has not yet realized its goal); Nir Kossovsky, Opinion: 
Fulfilling the Promise of the Business Roundtable’s Statement on Corporate Purpose, 
CORPORATE SECRETARY (Aug. 30, 2021), 
https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/boardroom/32698/opinion-fulfilling-promise-
business-roundtable%E2%80%99s-statement-corporate (arguing that companies 
overpromised in their adoptions of the Business Roundtable statement). 
75  See, e.g., Adina Holzman & Lisa Silverman, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation: 
733 Days Later, JD SUPRA (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/statement-
on-the-purpose-of-a-1577930/ (explaining the various stakeholders and their positions 
relative to the BR statement); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need 
for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by 
the Delaware General Corporation Law, Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law and Econ. Rsch. Paper 
No. 15-08, 6-7, 9 (2015).  
76 Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Was the Business Roundtable Statement Mostly for 
Show?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (August 19, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/18/was-the-business-roundtable-statement-mostly-
for-show-2-evidence-from-corporate-governance-guidelines/; Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Opinion: Here’s Evidence that Putting Customers and Employees First Turns Out to Be 
Profitable for a Company’s Stockholders Too, MarketWatch (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:12 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-evidence-that-putting-customers-and-employees-
first-turns-out-to-be-profitable-for-a-companys-stockholders-too-2020-10-14. 
77 Cunningham, supra note 76. 
78 Id. 
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catering to customers, rewarding employees, partnering with suppliers, and 
being good corporate citizens.79  
Nor is the Roundtable’s statement novel.80 In fact, it is almost a 
carbon-copy of the revered credo of Johnson & Johnson, in place since 
1943.81 Throughout that time, J&J has taken this mission statement seriously, 
if not flawlessly, tending to the interests of all constituents, and delivering 
shareholder profits as a result.82 
As for what shareholders might think, the companies signing the 
Roundtable’s statement are strong attractors of QSs.83 The QSDR includes 
most of the ~180 Roundtable statement’s signatories.84 Among those 
signatories, the vast majority rank in the top half for QS density, and one-
fourth in the top decile.85 In other words, QSs are drawn disproportionately 
to the companies whose CEOs signed the statement.86 
Nor is the Business Roundtable statement novel or unique.87 For 
many years, the Drucker Institute has advocated similar principles, 
associated with its namesake, management professor Peter Drucker.88 These 
are statistically rigorous measures of customer satisfaction, employee 
engagement, innovation, social responsibility, and financial strength.89 The 
Drucker Institute annually applies these principles to rank the companies in 
the S&P 500.90 There is a strong association between companies ranked 
highly by the Drucker Institute and QS density.91 
Why might QSs agree with the Business Roundtable’s mission 
statement and the Drucker Institute’s principles? For one, given the long-
term horizons of QSs, as compared to the short-term view of transient 
shareholders, what is good for a corporation’s employees, customers, 
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suppliers, and communities tends to be particularly good for long-term, high-
quality shareholders.92 
Second, given the focused investment approach of QSs, as compared 
to the all-market gauge of indexers, flexibility is essential, and the 
Roundtable’s statement and Drucker principles are appealingly flexible. 
They let individual companies express their mission their own way and are 
general enough that directors can meet their legal duties that, unchanged, 
require promoting the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 
Toward one end of the spectrum, consider the philosophy of 
signatory Stanley Bergman, Chairman and CEO of Henry Schein, a company 
that tops the charts for QS density and has outperformed for shareholders 
regularly since going public in 1995.93 
In a 2015 interview, Bergman put forth this view of corporate 
constituents:  
“For the suppliers, the customers and the [employee] teams to work 
together, you need capital, because it’s a business. We are very clear with 
Wall Street: Henry Schein does not exist for the investors. Having said that, 
we promise the investors a good rate of return and we deliver on those 
expectations.”94 
 
Toward the other end is the philosophy of an American business 
legend, the late Roberto Goizueta, who headed The Coca-Cola Company 
from 1981-1997.95 He often stated his view of corporate purpose as “the 
maximization of shareholder value.”96 On Goizueta’s watch, Coca-Cola was 
regularly ranked by Fortune Magazine among America’s most-admired 
companies.97 It delivered outsized shareholder returns by nurturing a 
business that catered to customers’ tastes, developed employees, and 
protected communities.98 The company was also deft at attracting QSs, most 
famously Warren Buffett.99 
Buffett exemplifies the middle ground. He is well-known for 
investing in companies that are “owner-oriented,” and takes that approach as 
CEO of Berkshire Hathaway.100 Yet he recognizes the need for balancing the 
interests of shareowners with employees and other constituents. Consider 




92 BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 71. 
93 CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 57-58. 
94 Id. at 58. 
95 Id.; Roberto Crispulo Goizueta, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 14, 2020), 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Roberto-Crispulo-Goizueta. 
96 CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 58.  
97 Edward A. Robinson, America’s Most Admired Companies, Fortune (Mar. 3, 1997), 
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1997/03/03/222760/index.htm. 
98 CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 58. 
99 See BUFFETT & CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 2, at 4.  
100 CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 56. 
[2021] LESSONS FROM QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS 25 
 
 
I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability 
merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of 
return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an 
exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once 
it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith 
would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx 
would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the 
only position that leaves me comfortable.101 
That comfortable middle ground is often reflected in the mission 
statements of many companies that top lists of both QS density and 
profitability.102 When companies focus on their constituents in these ways, 
shareholder profits should follow. QSs should be attracted, creating a 
virtuous circle that may explain the association between high QS density and 
superior corporate performance. While it may seem that the Business 
Roundtable now repudiates Milton Friedman’s views, QSs signal that there 
is far greater overlap than the heated debate suggests. 
The same is true when it comes to ESG, fashionable principles 
addressing matters of environmental, social, and governance significance.103 
QSs have been prospering by using such principles for decades, long before 
the United Nations popularized them in 2005.104  The QSI compared two 
recent ESG rankings, by Barron’s105 and Investors’ Business Daily,106 with 
the QSDR.  
The ESG and QS data correlate: the vast majority (80% or more) of 
high-ranking ESG companies also rank in the top half for QS density.107 
Topping the Barron’s/IBD lists of ESG companies that also rank high for QS 
are newer and older companies alike: younger companies such as Nvidia 
(1993) and Salesforce (1999), and venerable titans such as Colgate-
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Palmolive (1806), Procter & Gamble (1837), Kimberly Clark (1872), 
Kellogg (1906), Clorox (1913), Best Buy (1966), and Texas Instruments 
(1951).108 
History suggests that QSs are attracted to ESG principles because 
both reflect long-term company-specific thinking.109 Unlike past social 
movements, moreover, ESG keeps shareholder interests at the core of 
corporate mission, as documented in important research by Professors Lund 
and Pollman.110  
To put ESG in historical context, consider the debates over corporate 
purpose in the 1930s, following the Great Depression.  One side, led by 
Columbia University law professor Adolf Berle, argued that corporate 
directors must be accountable to shareholders;111 the other, led by Harvard 
University law professor Merrick Dodd, urged a corporate pursuit of social 
objectives.112 
Both views went mainstream, as companies focused on shareholder 
profits while making substantial charitable donations. The accommodation 
remained uneasy, however, as some reformers, such as economist Howard 
Bowen, advocated greater corporate “social responsibility.”113     
In the 1970s, debate reignited on corporate purpose. Economists, 
echoing Berle, favored shareholder primacy while critics, led by Ralph 
Nader, urged taming corporations to respond to public needs.114 The 
Naderites won many legislative milestones during the 1970s, from protecting 
consumers to the environment.115 But their assaults on corporate America 
went too far, it turned out, and an era focused solely on “shareholder value” 
followed.116 
In the takeover fights of the 1980s, insurgents stressed “shareholder 
value,” while embattled directors lobbied to consider “other constituencies,” 
especially employees and communities.117 Yet by urging prioritizing such 
constituents, advocates again overplayed their hand: in the end, directors 
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could legally incorporate interests of other constituencies but only if those 
rationally related to shareholder interests, which held priority.118   
From the 1990s, critics again assailed shareholder primacy as 
irresponsible.119 Despite gaining some prominence, this movement likewise 
overshot its mark by advocating diverting corporate assets from shareholders 
to others.120  
Still, these movements planted important seeds. For one, they 
revealed excesses of the status quo. As indicated in a 1987 Congressional 
report, obsession with stock prices arose, and with it pressure to put short-
term results over long-term gains.121 Boards started paying executives in 
corporate equity, riveting attention on stock price.122 Managers now 
publicized quarterly forecasts and hosted quarterly calls for investment 
analysts, stoking short-term pressure.123     
Researchers in the early 2000s, meanwhile, began finding 
correlations between certain practices deemed “socially responsible” and 
corporate financial performance, in categories from employee relations and 
pollution control to product quality and community involvement.124  
These dynamics set the stage in 2005 for the United Nations to issue 
its ESG principles.125 The U.N. said that “integrating ESG factors into 
corporate and investor decisionmaking was critical for the security of 
investments, prosperity, and growing markets.”126 It unveiled its “Principles 
for Responsible Investment” at the New York Stock Exchange, citadel of 
shareholder primacy. 127 
Unlike their predecessors, these ESG principles stress factors that 
enhance long-term shareholder value, an approach that concurs with history, 
law, and practicalities.128 As a result, ESG went mainstream.129  
From the 1980s to the early 2000s, socially responsible companies, 
such as Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream (founded in 1978) or The Body Shop 
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(1976), stood out as unusual.130 Today, companies that fail to acknowledge 
ESG are outliers.131 QSs favor ESG’s emphasis on businesses and strategies 
that are “sustainable,” a fashionable word that QSs have been using for 
decades.132 While radical adaptations of ESG principles are destined to 
follow history into failure, it is likely to endure if proponents keep the 
movement mainstream.133 Similarly, despite prevailing cultures of control in 
corporate life, people may actually do better when they are trusted rather 
than controlled.  
 
B. Corporate Culture and Trust134 
For decades, American corporate culture has moved in the direction 
of command and control.135 Boards faced rising pressure for accountability, 
leading them to command corporate officers to install elaborate internal 
controls, information systems and compliance programs.136 While well-
intentioned, such efforts dampen the bonds of trust employees up and down 
the ranks need to have.137  
Over the same period, corporate governance moved toward 
prescribed mandates for all companies.138 Today all boards are expected to 
follow delineated protocols ordained “best practices,” whether or not they 
are best for a particular company.139 Such uniformity diminishes the trust 
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that can form when directors and shareholders exchange views and make 
their own decisions based on the needs of the company.140 
Countering this trend of control is a trust-based culture.141 A trust-
based corporate culture relies on the assumption that businesses should be 
decentralized into the smallest possible units whose performance can 
usefully be measured to identify problems and opportunities.142 Hallmarks 
of a trust-based corporate culture therefore include autonomy and 
decentralization.143 
Trust is a powerful motivator.144 Autonomy empowers employees to 
focus on tasks rather than on reporting compliance. Payoffs include more 
effective leadership, lower cost of administration, and other corporate 
efficiencies.   
Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway exemplifies this approach.145 
It takes a famously hands-off approach to management, delegating all 
responsibility to the heads of its subsidiaries.146 The trust-based approach 
works because the most important quality Berkshire looks for in new 
managers and companies is trust—they pass up opportunities if they have a 
shred of doubt about trustworthiness.147 
Accountability follows. Based on interviews of scores of Berkshire 
executives over the years, the consensus view was summed up in a pithy 
comment by Jim Weber, head of Brooks Running Company where he said 
he had never been given so much autonomy in his business career and had 
never felt so accountable and responsible.148 
The tone of trust is set at the top and percolates throughout the 
organization in daily decisions, challenges, and crises, and the result 
constitutes the company’s culture.149 Trust-based corporate cultures may be 
characterized as learning organizations where employees enjoy considerable 
autonomy and where small groups are allowed to experiment and then share 
knowledge across the company.  
Such hallmarks continue to characterize a wide range of businesses 
today, especially insurance companies as well as diversified industrials. 
Insurance is a trust-based business, after all, where the product is the promise 
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to pay money and its value is almost entirely in being trusted to pay.150 In the 
broader market, exemplars of trust-based cultures vary but tend to be united 
by core practices such as autonomy and decentralization.151 
The Trust Across America (TAA) initiative has identified the most 
trustworthy U.S. public companies using objective and quantitative 
indicators including accounting conservativeness and financial stability, as 
well as a secondary screen of more subjective criteria such as employee 
reviews and news reports.152 Companies regarded as trustworthy also tend to 
rate highly in rankings of shareholder quality produced by the QSI, as well 
as the proprietary database of EQX, which we use to cross-check QSI data.153 
TAA’s assessment of the S&P 500 SPX, +0.75% in 2020 identified 51 
companies, of which 49 are also included in the QSI rankings. Comparing 
the two, more than one-fourth of the top TAA companies are in the top decile 
of the QSI; two-thirds are in the top quarter, and all but two (92%) are in the 
top half.154  Notably, both the TAA top 10 and the QSI Top 25 outperformed 
the S&P 500 by 30% and 50%, respectively, in recent five-year periods.155 
While some investors focus solely on the bottom line and others only 
on signals of corporate virtue, QSs are holistic, considering the inherent 
relationship between trust and long-term value.156 Nebulous as the notion of 
trust in corporate culture might seem, it’s a profitable as well as ethical value 
to probe.157 In the same spirit, contemporary commentary and policy has 
promoted uniformity in governance through rigid specification of practices. 
The QS research suggests that greater flexibility would be better, as 
discussed next. 
 
C. Governance Flexibility or Rigidity158 
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 Conventional wisdom is that a litany of governance practices, called 
good, correlate with superior corporate performance. But the QSI has found 
reasons to quarrel with this conventional wisdom in several contexts and 
more recent scholarship has undermined much of the edifice supporting the 
conventional views.  
            Empirical research on corporate governance dates back about two 
decades to pioneering work by finance professors Gompers, Ishi, and 
Metrick.159 Using data created by the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC, now part of Institutional Shareholder Services or ISS), an 
entire generation of researchers became convinced that there’s a difference 
between “good corporate governance” and “bad corporate governance.”160  
Good governance increases “democratic” shareholder rights, like one-
share/one-vote, and bad governance increases “despotic” managerial power, 
like a CEO also chairing the board.  Good governance reaps better returns 
for shareholders than bad governance, conventional wisdom and much 
scholarship held.161 
            But according to the new study by law professors Jens Frankenreiter, 
Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili and Eric Talley (FHNT), this research contains 
many errors.162 Coders misinterpreted source material on some basic 
features163, such as whether a company had dual class shares, a staggered 
board or supermajority voting. In a multi-year effort, these scholars have 
built an entirely new dataset they hand-coded from the governance 
provisions of nearly 3,000 public company charters.164 Comparing their 
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findings with the original IRRC data and its offspring, FHNT report 
“alarming” errors in the original coding.165 Aggregate effects are dramatic, 
such as erasing most of any return premium to democratic compared to 
despotic companies.  
            Defenders of the status quo stress that the new research does not 
undermine the entire edifice, as much data and advice have been generated 
using other tools, such as relating executive compensation to corporate 
performance.166 But critics welcome the spotlight the new research shines on 
the often-obscure data behind the received wisdom in today’s governance 
debates, from takeover defenses to shareholder voting methods.167 
            For investors, the new research highlights that it’s unwise to rely 
blindly on assertions of what counts as good or bad governance from any 
source—proxy advisors, data analytics vendors, professional service firms 
or academics. All participants must probe the quality of the underlying 
datasets, particularly whether governance scores are based on these 
erroneous indexes.168   
 Scholars should be particularly attentive to the perceived causes of 
these longstanding errors. For one, proprietary services such as ISS and 
MSCI have incentives to maintain strict data control, selectively selling 
access for substantial premiums to commercial clients.169 For another,  
chief researchers in governance data analytics have been from fields such as 
finance, not law. The researchers encourage lawyers to dig into the data 
too—something the QSI is taking seriously, as reported in this Article.  
 In the context of received wisdom on good versus bad governance, 
we compared an important annual study of Canadian boards with a study of 
their company’s corporate performance. The Canadian investment 
community tends to follow that of the U.S. closely, including on the 
conventional wisdom of what counts as good governance. 
 In the 2020 installment, researchers at the University of Toronto’s 
Johnston Centre for Corporate Governance Innovation defined a set of 
boardroom best practices and then ranked companies based on their degree 
 
165 Id. 
166 Approach Hyperbolic Claims About the New Corporate Governance Data with 
Skepticism, VALUEEDGE ADVISORS (Mar. 14, 2021), 
https://valueedgeadvisors.com/2021/03/14/approach-hyperbolic-claims-about-the-new-
corporate-governance-data-with-skepticism.  
167 John Jenkins, Corporate Governance: Back to the Drawing Board?, THE CORPORATE 
COUNSEL (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/2021/03/corporate-
governance-back-to-the-drawing-board.html. 
168 It also pays to understand the provider’s baseline for good governance. The literature 
traditionally references corporate performance or shareholder returns as the baselines, 
whereas today’s providers may stress different priorities associated with such movements as 
impact investing, socially responsible investing or ESG investing. Cunningham, supra note 
158. 
169  States like Delaware, the leading charterer of corporations, charge hefty fees to obtain 
corporate charters and make them available in technologically primitive formats.  The 
FHNT research team estimates the total cost of building a database from the Delaware 
charters alone would be half a million dollars. Frankenreiter, supra note 14, at 17-18. 
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of conformity with it.170 They established four categories — board 
composition, director share ownership, shareholder rights, and disclosure — 
and used 38 different indicators to rank 211 S&P/TSX issuers.171 
In a study of “value-investor CEOs,” that is, CEOs who had the 
investing skills necessary to deploy the cash company cash to the best value-
maximizing opportunity, Professor Athanassakos identified an elite group of 
exceptional capital allocators, 41 Canadian and 167 American.172 The study 
ranked companies by their success in capital allocation and then compared 
portfolios comprised of those at the top versus the bottom.173 On average, the 
superior allocator portfolio outperformed the inferior one by 33 per cent in 
cumulative three-year returns over several recent decades.174 
Overlaps in the data sets are revealing. Of the best 41 Canadian 
capital-allocating companies, 28 were also ranked in the University of 
Toronto governance study.175 Among the leading capital allocators, however, 
only four ranked in the top quarter of the governance rankings.176 By 
contrast, some of the best capital allocators ranked lowest on the governance 
scale.177 In related research, the QSI found that the superior allocators ranked 
high in attracting QSs.178 
 
CEO and Chair 
Turning to governance, the U of T rankings give the highest marks 
for conforming to standardized practices, without probing to what extent, if 
at all, they may be expected to result in superior capital allocation or 
shareholder stewardship.179 For instance, the study credits companies that 
split the roles of chairman and CEO, but without recognizing that combining 
them remains both common and apparently effective at a large portion of 
public companies.180  
 
170 See David Milstead, Board Games 2020: How We Ranked Canada’s Corporate Boards, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 30, 2020).  
171  See BOARD GAMES: 19 YEARS OF SHINING A SPOTLIGHT INTO CANADA'S BOARDROOMS, 
DAVID AND SHARON JOHNSTON CENTRE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, 
ROTMAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, (Nov. 30, 2020). 
172 See George Athanassakos, Do high quality shareholders gravitate to companies led by 
good asset allocator CEOs? Ben Graham Centre Blog (May 11, (2020)), 
https://www.ivey.uwo.ca/bengrahaminvesting/blog/2020/05/do-high-quality-shareholders-
gravitate-to-companies-led-by-good-asset-allocator-ceos/; See also George Athanassakos 
and Lawrence A. Cunningham, Pick one – conformist governance or good capital 
allocation, FINANCIAL POST (Dec. 15, 2020). 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. See also Milstead, supra note 170. 
176 These are: Emera, TC Energy, Fortis and Telus. See Milstead, supra note 170. 
177 These included CGI, Restaurant Brands, Rogers Communications, and Westshore 
Terminals. See id. 
178 See infra Section III.E.1. 
179 See Milstead, supra note 170. 
180 See SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 18 (2020); id. 
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 Leading indexers and proxy advisers oppose combining the roles 
because boards appoint and oversee the CEO.181 Having one person wear 
both hats creates a conflict, they say. Yet many corporations thrive when led 
by an outstanding person serving as both chair and chief, while others have 
failed amid split roles—Enron is an example.182 After all, board chairs get 
only one vote, so it comes down to the capability of the other directors. Good 
ones neutralize such a conflict.  
The data supports the view that context matters.  About half the S&P 
500 companies split the functions while the other half combines them.183 
Despite indexer complaints, QSs are as likely to own stakes in companies 
that split these functions as those that combine them, according to QSI data. 
They look past formal checklists to substantive details.    
Corporate performance results show that there is no right or wrong 
answer, only “it depends.” Among 20 best-performing companies over the 
past decade, the proportion with each practice matched the overall proportion 
of companies using it.184 In other words, these practices add or subtract value 
depending on context, especially the chief executive’s identity and the 
board’s caliber, even the shareholder makeup.  
 
Multiple share classes  
Likewise, the U of T study credits “one-share, one-vote” capital 
structures, thus penalizing dual-class companies, but without considering the 
particular history, reasons and context for the structure at different 
companies.   
By convention, every corporate share has one vote; but in these 
setups, insiders often get more votes for their shares than outsiders, putting 
power in a controlling minority. Critics say that insulates controllers from 
accountability and market discipline.185 They lobbied unsuccessfully to 
 
181 E.g., Institutional Shareholder Service, Proxy Voting Guidelines 19-20 (2020). 
182 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Secret Sauce of Corporate Leadership, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
25, 2015); See also generally Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 
42:2 THE J. OF CORP. L., 359, 383 (2016). 
183 Companies remain nearly evenly divided over the practice; among the S&P 500, for 
instance, 55% splitting the functions and 45% combining them. See SPENCER STUART 
BOARD INDEX (2020) at 18.  Our statistics are based on Spencer Stuart’s 2018 data for the 
S&P 500 showing that 229 split and 245 combine; of these, 216 and 234, respectively, 
appear in the QSDR.  Of those splitting, 16% are in the top 10%, 40% in the top quarter, and 
89% in the top half; of those combining, 28% are in the top 10%, 57% in the top quarter, 
and 84% in the top half.   
184 See Philip van Doorn, These Are the 20 Best-performing Stocks of the Past Decade, 
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 28, 2019). https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-are-the-20-
best-performing-stocks-of-the-past-decade-and-some-of-them-will-surprise-you-2019-12-
09.  
185 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class 
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 602 (2017). 
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outlaw the practice, but in 2017 prevailed upon indexers, such as S&P, to 
exclude newly listed dual class stock.186 
 Yet even after the index exclusion, dual class companies continued 
to go public, joining hundreds of others who have followed the practice for 
decades.187 These include such long-term stalwarts as Aflac, Berkshire 
Hathaway, Estee Lauder Companies and The New York Times Company, as 
well as contemporary starlets like Alphabet (Google), Facebook, and 
Snap.188 The practice is ideal for certain company types, especially those 
needing quality shareholders to support long-term businesses, such as spirits 
(Brown Forman), or those with valuable roots in families (Tootsie Roll 
Industries) or entrepreneurs (Nike).189 
Terms also vary, from simple board seat allocations to complex 
control formulas. Some even protect outsiders against insider tyranny, such 
as at McCormick & Co. and United Parcel Service.190 It’s no wonder, yet 
again, that QSs are not averse to owning shares in dual class companies, 
according to QSI data.  
In short, while corporate tradition provides shareholders with one-
vote-per-share, alternative shareholder voting rules abound. Examples 
include dual class structures giving different votes-per-share to different 
classes, as well as time-weighted voting, more votes to longer-held shares.191 
QSs are attracted to many such companies, including those listed in Table 
III.1, which rank in the top quartile of QS density. The data suggest that QSs 
examine capital structures on a case-by-case basis rather than making blanket 
condemnations (or proclamations).192 
 
 
186 Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Discussion Draft: Investor as Owner 
Subcommittee of SEC Investor Advisory Committee 2 (2017); see also Amy Deen 
Westbrook and David A. Westbrook, Snapchat’s Gift: Equity Culture in High-Tech Firms, 
46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 866 (2019). 
187 See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion, 99 B.U. L. 
REV. 1229, 1266, 69 (2019). 
188 Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Companies List 1-2, 5, 15-16 (2017). 
189 Cunningham, supra note 9, at 45; see also id at 2, 11, 16. See also Dorothy S. Lund, 
Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2019). 
190 See generally Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Companies List 10, 17 
(2017) (voting structures that cap voting power after a given ownership level threshold help 
ensure powerful insider shareholders cannot dictate over smaller shareholders). 
191See Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased 
Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L.  The importance of QSs warrants considering “quality voting”—
more votes to longer-held shares owned by concentrated shareholders. See Lynne L. Dallas 
& Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
541, 564 (2016). See also Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, Loyalty-Shares: Rewarding 
Long-term Investors, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 86 (2013). 
192 Comparing the CII’s list of 225 companies, supra note 188, with the QSDR, 135 
companies appear on both lists. The data largely followed a random pattern, rather than 
being skewed, with 11% in the top 10%; 30% in the top 25%Q; and 64% appeared in the 
50%. 
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Aflac     
Berkshire Hathaway 
Brown-Forman   
Constellation Brands    
Discovery Comm. 
DISH Network  
Erie Indemnity 
Estee-Lauder Companies  
John Wiley & Sons   
Expedia   
Graham Holdings  
Hyatt Hotels     




New York Times Co. 
United Parcel Service 
Table III.1: Dual Class and QS Density 
 
 Empirical evidence on the effects of time-weighted voting is 
limited.193 Only a handful of U.S. companies currently maintain time-
weighted voting: Aflac, Carlisle, J.M. Smucker, Quaker Chemical, and 
Synovus Financial.194 A few others once employed time-weighted voting but 
have since rescinded it: CenturyTel, Church & Dwight, Cincinnati Milacron, 
Roper, and Shaw Group.195 Despite the small sample size, all five U.S. 
companies that have time-weighted voting rank high in attracting QSs.196 
 
Director Share Ownership 
The U of T ranking credits boards that require directors to own a 
certain amount of the company’s stock, when it would obviously be 
preferable to credit directors who buy large stakes without being required to 
do so.197 Similarly, the rankings weight handling of stock options heavily — 
in terms of hurdles, vesting periods, dilution — without crediting companies 
who simply avoid using them due to their questionable effects and contested 
accounting.198  
 
193 See David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting and 
the U.S. Public Company, 72 BUS. L. 295, 307 (2017).  
194 Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Companies List 1, 3, 12, 15 (2017). 
195 The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of a charter amendment adopting time-
weighted voting in Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). 
196 Much as with the debate over dual class and the contrary QSI findings are the debate and 
findings concerning staggered board of director terms. Both debates reflect a similar 
substance versus form battle. At some companies, every director stands for election every 
year while at others only one-third do, each for three-year terms. Critics oppose such three-
year terms as impairing board accountability.  See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 39. Yet a 
staggered board may enable a company to embrace a longer time horizon than one that can 
turn over completely in any year. Value arises from such binding commitments to long-term 
strategies. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe, & Saura Masconale, Is the Staggered 
Board Debate Really Settled?, 167 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2019). These realities are 
reflected in historical company practices, which vary. Staggered boards are used at nearly 
half of Russell 3000 companies, although the figure among S&P 500 companies has fallen 
to about 60, in response to indexer pressure in recent years. QSs grasp this point too: they 
invest just as much in companies with staggered boards as without them, according to the 
following data analysis. We compared the 61 companies among the S&P 500 with staggered 
boards to the first 61 in alphabetical order that do not. We related each group of 61 to the 
QSDR. The data showed a very slight preference for unitary boards: among the top decile of 
QSDR companies, 8 had classified boards versus 22 unitary; among the top quarter of 
QSDR companies, 25 had classified boards versus 34 unitary; and among the top half were 
52 and 53, indistinguishable.   
197 Athanassakos & Cunningham, supra note 172; Milstead, supra note 170. 
198  Id. 
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 To QSs, director share ownership is a signal about stewardship: 
directors will act most like shareholders when they are shareholders; the 
higher the stakes, the more passionate the stewardship. The underlying logic 
can be seen by considering the field of venture capital, where the effects of 
a company’s major shareholder-directors are clear.  
 The standard-bearer here is the legendary George Ohrstrom. 
Through his venture firm, Ohrstrom sagely guided the incubation of such 
durable companies as Carlisle, Dover and Roper Technologies.199 While no 
intelligent investor blindly follows others or simplistic formulas, its pays to 
watch what the Ohrstroms of the world do. 
 Beyond venture capital, the research indicates that among large 
public companies today, a high proportion of QSs correlates with superior 
corporate performance. In companies that lead the charts in both shareholder 
quality and performance, a common feature is at least one director with large 
long-term personal stakes. In addition to those mentioned in what follows, 
some examples appear in Table III.2.200 
 




Cincinnati Financial  




Illinois Tool Works  
Jack Henry & Associates 
O’Reilly Automotive   
Public Storage 
Ross Stores 
Selective Insurance Group 
Table III.2: Substantial Director-Owner QS Density 
 
Some CEOs publicly attest to the value of such directors. One is 
Mike Jackson, CEO for more than twenty years at AutoNation. The 
company, owner of a network of car dealers, attracted an impressive list of 
quality shareholders over those decades.  From among these, two joined the 
board, whom Jackson credits with vastly improved corporate performance. 
Each held 15-16% of the stock for more than a decade: investor Eddie 
Lampert tutored board colleagues on capital allocation and Michael Larson 
of the Gates Foundation counseled them on disciplined, patient long-term 
thinking.201   
The board of Credit Acceptance Corporation, lender to sub-prime 
borrowers, boasts two quality shareholders: Scott Vassalluzzo, of Prescott 
 
199 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: These 15 Companies are run in a Warren 
Buffet-like way, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 27, 2021). 
200 Director ownership rankings are based on data for director share ownership in WRDS's 
ISS Directors database, presenting 2019 data for S&P 400, 500, and 600 companies. 
Director profiles were obtained from individual company websites and/or proxy statements. 
Featured companies are those whose board included at least one independent director with 
significant long-term holdings in the company (a QS), ranking in the top five percent of the 
QSDR, and outperforming indexes described in Section I. 
201 CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 43. 
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General Partners, which owns 10% of the stock, and Tom Tryforos, who 
teaches the fundamentals of traditional investing at Columbia Business 
School.202  CEO Brett Roberts attests to the enduring value of their board 
service, stressing in a shareholder letter how Tryforos’s perspective as an 
investor helped managers appreciate that all corporate decisions must be 
tested in terms of a minimum return on capital.203  
 Many other companies adept at attracting quality shareholders have 
named some to their boards: Berkshire Hathaway in 2005 appointed Sandy 
Gottesman of First Manhattan, the company’s largest shareholder after 
Warren Buffett since 1966; Constellation Software has since going public in 
2006 benefited from the board service of Steve Scotchmer, a distinguished 
Canadian investor and owner of a large personal stake for decades; and for 
many years Enstar Group’s board included Chuck Akre, a noted QS. 
 Through 2013 when The Washington Post Company sold its 
flagship newspaper, the company had since 1976 saved nearly one billion 
dollars in pension plan costs thanks to savvy investment advice given by the 
prominent investors Sandy Gottesman and Bill Ruane.204  Those mavens 
were suggested and introduced to the company by one of its earliest and 
revered QSs: Buffett.205 Another Washington Post veteran is Alan Spoon, of 
Polaris Partners, also a shareholder-oriented director adding value at such 
companies as Danaher, Fortive and IAC, and formerly Cable One.206     
 Identifying companies with such outstanding directors is not as easy 
as it should be (though the original data is in public securities filings).207  You 
might expect them to be identified by activist shareholders in contested 
director elections squaring off with incumbents. But such fights often pivot 
instead on specific strategy and executive leadership and the challengers 
rarely acquire large stakes on spec.  
 It would be helpful if large institutional investors rated director share 
ownership highly in their assessments, but that is unfortunately not the case. 
The guidelines of many indexers and advisors, for instance, emphasize 
 
202 Id. at 43-44 
203 Id. at 44. 
204 See “Letter of Donald Graham to Shareholders of the Washington Post Co.” (2003), 
reprinted in Lawrence A. Cunningham, Dear Shareholder (Petersfield: Harriman House, 
2020). 
178A Warren Buffet, “The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville,” Hermes, 1984. 
205 Warren Buffet, The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville, HERMES, 1984. 
206 Meet Fortive: Board of Directors, FORTIVE, https://fortive.com/meet-fortive#board, (last 
visited Sep. 15, 2021); Directors: Alan Spoon, IAC, https://www.iac.com/directors/alan-
spoon (last visited Sep. 14, 2021). 
207 Proxy statements disclose director ownership in a section entitled “Security Ownership 
of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management” found in a company’s annual proxy 
statement (Schedule 14A). SEC forms 3, 4 and 5, as well as Schedule 13D and 13G, also 
track corporate insider transactions. 
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instead features such as director independence from management, meeting 
attendance records, and number of other boards a director serves on.208  
 The governance community has successfully advocated for 
corporate policies requiring or exhorting minimum director stock ownership. 
A common benchmark is to own shares worth triple the annual board 
retainer, within a few years of starting service—a goal increasingly 
facilitated by board compensation paid in shares.209  
While this is probably desirable, the strongest signal of alignment is 
directors who, on their own rather than due to company policy, buy 
substantial stakes in their company. The logic is as easy as the simple slogan 
“we eat our own cooking.” 
* * * * * 
Why might indexers and other critics universally condemn corporate 
practices that QSs accept and that may enhance a company’s performance? 
Different business models may explain: indexers address the market as a 
whole while QSs focus on specific companies.  
Indexers prescribe policies expected to benefit the overall market, 
on average, not particular businesses. The size and reach of indexers—
commanding around one-third of public equity—give them outsized 
influence, and a wide critical following. But they have small stewardship 
staffs and minuscule budgets to address particular companies, according to 
research by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst—no more than 45 people 
covering well more than 3,000 U.S. companies.210 
QSs appreciate that indexers may present “best practices” in general. 
Yet without examining context, some companies will not get the governance 
that is best for them.  The indexing business model makes one-size-fits-all 
governance an imperative. But that should not stop QSs or companies from 
fashioning a tailored approach. 
 
D. Director Diversity211 
A broader consensus seems to support director share ownership and 
board diversity, as these are advocated by many different kinds of 
shareholders, especially indexers, and fully embraced by QSs.  But there are 
important differences in emphasis or approach.  
 
208 See generally ISS United States Procedures & Policies (Non-Compensation) Frequently 
Asked Questions, April 21, 2021 (showing general guidance regarding how ISS analyzes 
certain issues and determines recommendations for companies). 
209 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder 
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 141–43 (2020). See also, e.g., ISS United States 
Procedures & Policies (Non-Compensation) Frequently Asked Questions 22 (2021). 
210 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 6, at 2077-78. 
211 This section is adapted from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: S&P Corporate 
Boards Lack Diversity, but theses top companies are leading change – and the stock market 
rewards them, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2020, 9:38 AM) 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-500-corporate-boards-lack-diversity-but-these-top-
companies-are-leading-change-and-the-stock-market-rewards-them-2020-10-23; in turn 
drawing on Lawrence A. Cunningham, Board Gender Diversity: Debate and Practice, 63 
CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 244 (2020). 
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Companies appeared to react under public compulsion when adding 
diversity to boards in the aftermath of the national conversation on race 
sparked during the tumultuous summer of 2020.212 Due attention zeroed in 
on racial and gender inclusion across the nation’s boardrooms. You’ll see 
both progress and challenges. One discovery: QSs appreciate board 
diversity.  
Few dispute that there has been female and minority 
underrepresentation on corporate boards compared to the population. 
Although 13.4% of the U.S. population are Black, close to 200 companies in 
the S&P 500 have no Black director and only 8% of that cohort’s directors 
are Black, based on data collated by Institutional Shareholder Services 
analyzed by the QSI.213  
While every S&P 500 board has at least one female director today, 
women hold a little over 25% of the total seats.214 Among the broader Russell 
3000, just over 24% of seats are held by women, although 61% of those 
companies have 20% or more female members, according to the advocacy 
group 5050 Women on Boards.215  
All these percentages are up from a decade ago,216 and there is 
reasoned debate over the pace of change. But disagreement rages on the 
causes of underrepresentation. Among disputed causes: lack of prioritization 
by boards; gender and racial stereotypes or in-group bias, and 
underrepresentation of women or minorities in traditional pools or pipelines 
(which may, in turn, owe to stereotypes and biases).217  
One reason the rate of progress is slower than some desire may be 
the mixed rationales for the quest. There are two broad potential rationales 
for board diversity: (1) the quantifiable economic interests of corporations 
and their shareholders, and/or (2) the qualitative social aspects of group 
decision-making and intuitions of fairness.   
 
212 See Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics, 130 YALE L. J. F. 
869, 884–85 (2021). 
213 Quality Shareholders Initiative, QSI Database of Quality Shareholders (on file with the 
author and the QSI).  
214 Jeff Green, Women Gained 22 Seats on S&P 500 Boards in January Surge, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 23, 2021, 6:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-23/women-
gained-22-seats-on-s-p-500-boards-in-january-surge; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
Board Gender Diversity: Debate and Practice, 63 CAN. BUS. L. J. 244 (2020). 
215 Gender Diversity Index First Quarter 2021 Key Findings, 5050 WOMEN ON BOARDS, at 
1, https://5050wob.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Q1-2021-
Infographic_Final_EQUILAR.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2021); 2020 Women On Boards 
Gender Diversity Index: 2020 Progress of Women Corporate Directors by Company Size, 
State and Industry Sector, 5050 WOMEN ON BOARDS, at 3, https://5050wob.com/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/2020-Gender-Diversity-Index-Report-FINAL.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2021). See also Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Top 10 Topics for 
Directors: Board Diversity, NEWSTEX (Feb 06, 2020).  
216 See Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, supra note 215. See also Lisa M. Fairfax, 
The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for 
Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 799-800 (2005). 
217 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 216, at 799-810. 
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Empirical research on whether diversity improves corporate 
economic performance is equivocal. Numerous studies find a positive 
association between gender diversity and economic performance, including 
those of Catalyst and Morgan Stanley Research.218 But almost none find any 
causation, according to a comprehensive survey by Deborah Rhode and 
Amanda Packel.219 
The data may reflect how high-performance leads to diversity, as 
much as that diversity leads to high performance. Testing the effects of board 
diversity on economic performance is complicated by the variety of relevant 
contexts to consider — such as board and company size, geography or 
industry — as well as the variety of board settings, such as addressing 
acquisitions, dividends, executive pay, financial reporting or corporate 
culture. 
The social case is more compelling.220 First, the strongest general 
argument for board diversity is simple: the best group decisions result from 
a number of people with a wide variety of backgrounds viewing an issue 
from many angles.221 It is also clear that boards should reflect a corporation’s 
various constituents, meaning diversity not only of race and gender but 
varying ethnic, cultural and other personal characteristics.222  
Mere tokenism won’t suffice. Investor groups suggest that only with 
a minimum representation of at least 20% do contributions of outsider groups 
cease being representative of that group but get judged on merit.223 That 
occurs more readily when members are selected voluntarily rather than by 
compulsion.224 That’s one reason why legal diversity quotas, such as 
California has enacted for companies headquartered there,225 may miss their 
mark.     
 
218 See, e.g., David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm 
Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 36 (2004). CATALYST, BOTTOM LINE: CONNECTING CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE AND GENDER DIVERSITY 1 (2004); Why Diversity and Inclusion Matter 
(Quick Take), CATALYST (June 24, 2020), https://www.catalyst.org/research/why-diversity-
and-inclusion-matter/; Eva T Zlotnicka et al., Sustainable and Responsible: A Framework 
for Gender Diversity in the Workplace, MORGAN STANLEY RSCH., Mar. 31, 2016, at 2. 
219 Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much 
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL J. CORP. L. 377, 390 (2014); see also Amanda K. 
Packel, Government Intervention into Board Composition: Gender Quotas in Norway and 
Diversity Disclosures in the United States, 21 STAN. J. L. & BUS. 192, 201 (2016) (reviewing 
AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY (2015)). 
220 See, e.g., CATALYST, supra note 218. See also Fairfax, supra note 216, at 810-11. 
221 See Fairfax, supra note 216, at 831-32. 
222 See id. at 820, 21. 
223 See e.g., 30% Club Canadian Investor Group, Statement of Intent, (Sept. 2017), 
https://30percentclub.org/assets/uploads/30_percent_Club_Canadian_Investor_Statement_U
pdated_May_2019_v2.pdf. 
224 See generally Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The 
Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, Q. J.OF ECON. 137, 
139-140 (2012) (noting that forced board diversity may lead to underexperienced 
individuals being appointed to boards and can adversely affect firm value). 
225 Assemb. B. No. 979 (Cal. Sept. 30, 2020). 
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As for what shareholders might think, the QSI ranks most of those 
identified by the 2020 Women on Boards as having the greatest percentage 
of women directors.  Among those, 70% are in the top half for QS density.226 
The nineteen in the top decile are listed in Table III.4. 
 
Alliant Energy 
Am. States Water  
American Tower   
Am. Water Works 
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.  
Associated Banc-Corp.  
Eli Lilly & Company 
Estee Lauder Companies  
HNI Corporation 
Intl. Flavors & Fragrances 
Johnson & Johnson 
Kaiser Aluminum 
Pepsico 
Sensient Technologies  
Stryker Corporation 
Sysco Corporation 
Walt Disney Company 
Waters Corporation 
Xcel Energy, Inc. 
Table III.4: Women on Boards and QS Density 
Concerning Black directors, the QSI crunched the data from 
Institutional Shareholder Services of S&P 500 companies. One notable 
finding: a select group of such companies boasts three Black directors over 
the past few years, all representing at least 20% of the board. All nine of 












Table III.5: Black Directors on Boards and QS Density 
 
What might explain these associations? The correlation between QS 
density and diversity, of both gender and race, may be due to the long-term 
horizons of QSs. Compared to the short-term view of transient shareholders, 
QSs benefit more from the multiple viewpoints on boards that come from 
diversity.  
The association between QS density and multiple Black directors on 
a board may reflect the focused investment approach of QSs. Indexers, who 
own small stakes in every company, may have to be content with quota-type 
 
226  The 2020 Women on Boards' Honor Roll Companies for 2017 include 176 companies 
that have been Winning 'W' Companies for seven consecutive years, 2011-2017.  Of those 
176 companies, 133 appeared in the QSDR. Among those, 70% of the honorees were in the 
top half in the QSDR (92/133), 40% were in the top quarter (54/133), and 15% were in the 
top decile (19/133). See calculations infra Appendix B. 
227 From ISS data, we selected all Black directors holding office during 2018 or 2019 or 
both, eliminated duplicate names, then listed the companies, and, using a word count 
function, counted the companies appearing most, then went to their websites to verify the 
composition of their current boards. 
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guidelines advocating one minority director per board. QSs, who focus on 
particular companies, care about individual identities, which may result in 
greater diversity than a quota system would yield.   
There may be a long way to go on board gender and racial diversity, 
and it remains true that the social case is stronger at present than the 
economic one. Everyone also agrees that director quality remains paramount. 
But these observations do suggest that America’s best shareholders and 
board diversity go hand-in-hand. 
 
E. What Else Matters?  
 The prevailing literature on corporate governance—as well as ESG 
and other variations—seem to fixate attention on variables whose reliability 
is now contested and whose relevance is put in doubt by the QSI research.  
Beyond such topics reside many of greater interest to QSs and that therefore 
should be of greater interest to researchers and scholars. The following 
highlights four examples of what matters most that’s been examined least. 
 1. Capital Allocation.228  Effective capital allocators put every 
corporate dollar to its highest use, from organic or acquired growth to share 
buybacks or dividends. They do so with an investors’ mindset that all 
managers and shareholders would profit from understanding.  
 An elite group of 167 exceptional capital allocators is identified in 
research by Professor George Athanassakos.229 The study ranks companies 
by capital allocation success and then compares portfolios comprised of 
those at the top versus the bottom.230 On average, the superior allocator 
portfolio outperformed the inferior one by 33%, in terms of cumulative three-
year returns, over several recent decades.231   
Most such companies are also in the QSDR.   Among companies on 
both lists, the capital allocators rank disproportionately high for QS density: 
26% in the top decile of QS density; 56% in the top quarter; and 75% in the 
top half.  Here is a sampling of companies topping the combined lists of deft 
allocators and QS density: 
 
Amphenol Corp. Jack Henry & Assocs. 
 
228 This sub-section is adapted from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Why companies 
that spend their capital wisely are smart places for your money, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 31, 
2020, 9:31 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-savvy-companies-know-that-
doing-this-one-thing-well-is-the-secret-to-attracting-long-term-stable-shareholders-2020-10-
29. 
229 See George Athanassakos, Do Value Investor CEOs Outperform? (April 20, 2020) 
(unpublished working paper) (on file with Western University). The assertion in the text is 
based on comparing the companies identified by Professor Athanassakos as led by 
exceptional capital allocators to the QSDR. Of the 167 companies identified by Professor 
Athanassakos, 140 are in the QSDR.  Among those, 26% are in the top 10% of the QSDR; 
56% are in the top quarter; and 75% are in the top half.   See also Athanassakos, supra note 
229. 
230See Athanassakos, supra note 229. 
231 Id. 





Illinois Tool Works 
Moody's Corp. 
Roper Technologies Inc. 
Stryker Corp. 
Texas Instruments 
Table III.6: Capital Allocation and QS Density 
 
What sets these managers and shareholders apart? Their emphasis 
differs from quarterly earnings per share (EPS) favored by traders or market 
capitalization that’s of interest to indexers. They stress instead intrinsic 
value, long-term performance metrics such as return on invested capital 
(ROIC), and analytics like internal rate of return (IRR). 
ROIC is a good way to measure capital allocation effectiveness. At 
the corporate level, a good proxy takes bottom line performance, such as 
annual net income, as a percentage of average capital invested by 
shareholders. Individual projects are evaluated in terms of IRR, starting with 
capital expenditures to expand existing businesses as well as research and 
development budgets.232 
Successful capital allocators are especially cautious when it comes 
to acquisitions.233 They insist on paying a price below a target company’s 
intrinsic value and delivering an expected return that exceeds a preset hurdle 
rate. Such an investor mindset guards against managerial appetites for 
empire building and temptations of rosy forecasts about synergies, which 
often lead to acquisitions that destroy capital. 
On share buybacks, some favor them because they increase earnings 
per share simply by reducing shares outstanding. That may boost incentive-
based pay for managers and spur stock price for traders ready to cash in. But 
capital allocators see buybacks as investments. To them, buybacks are 
rational only when price is below a conservative estimate of per share 
intrinsic value. (That’s why they shun buyback quota programs.) 
Finally, on dividends, many capital allocators see them as rational 
only whenever other uses of capital — such as reinvestment, acquisitions or 
buybacks — are unattractive.234 To many, all excess capital should be 
returned to the shareholders — no cash hoarding. 
Others recognize that dividend policy shapes the shareholder base. 
A no-dividend policy may suit a largely taxable shareholder base while 
regular dividends give shareholders a reason to stay put in troubled times. 
Regular dividends can lengthen holding periods, marginalizing transients, 
and induce larger positions, marginalizing indexers. 
 
232 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Why Companies That Spend Their Capital Wisely 
Are Smart Places for Your Money, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 31, 2020, 9:31 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-savvy-companies-know-that-doing-this-one-
thing-well-is-the-secret-to-attracting-long-term-stable-shareholders-2020-10-29. 
233 Id at 3. 
234 Id. 
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 2. Sustainable Moats.235  Companies that attract a high density of QSs 
tend to boast competitive advantages that protect business performance 
against a variety of threats.  Often referred to as moats, these include 
economies of scale, credence value, intellectual property, network effects, 
distribution systems, and brand strength.236  
Morningstar publishes a list of some 500 companies regarded as having 
among the strongest moats, 200 of which are in the QSDR database.237 Of 
those 200 companies common to both, one-third are in the top decile of the 
QSDR; two-thirds are in the top quarter; and the overwhelming majority—
nearly 90%—are in the top half. This confirms widely known anecdotal 
















Table III.7: Moats and QS Density 
 Among moats, brand strength appears to be a particular magnet for 
QSs. There is a strong association between managers regarded as the best 
stewards of great brands and QSI rankings. For instance, among U.S. 
managers ranked in the global elite for brand guardianship, virtually all are 















235 This sub-section is adapted from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Wanted: Stock 
Investors with Time and Money to Support Profitable, Well-Run Companies, 
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-you-a-
stock-investor-with-time-and-money-these-top-companies-want-you-2020-10-20 and 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Why Companies That Spend Their Capital Wisely Are 
Smart Places for Your Money, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 31, 2020, 9:31 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-savvy-companies-know-that-doing-this-one-
thing-well-is-the-secret-to-attracting-long-term-stable-shareholders-2020-10-29. 
236 See Kanuri & McLeod, Sustainable competitive advantage and stock performance: the 
case for wide moat stocks, 48 APPLIED ECONOMICS 5117, 5119 (2016). 
237 Wide-Moat Focus Index, MORNINGSTAR, https://www.morningstar.com/best-
investments/wide-moat-focus. 
238 The list of the top 100 brand managers is taken from Global 500 2019 The Annual 
Report on the World’s Most Valuable Brands, BRAND FINANCE 36-37 (Jan. 2019), 
https://brandfinance.com/wp-content/uploads/1/global_500_2019_locked_4.pdf (“Brand 
Guardianship Index”). Of the 38 U.S. managers on the Brand Guardian Index, 36 of them 
are in the QSDR. Among those, more than one-third are in the top 10% of the QSDR; 75% 
are in the top quarter; and 97% are in the top half. 
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Table III.8: Brands and QS Density 
A more intriguing reason why high densities of QSs are associated 
with corporate outperformance is that the QS cohort is itself a source of 
competitive advantage, akin to network effects.  These arise when a system’s 
value increases as more people use it.  In most cases, network effects 
represent a tangible benefit to customers, as with fax machines in the old 
days and social media today.   
Similar advantages can arise from a network of QSs. As a group, 
QSs are more likely than other major shareholder cohorts -- such as indexers 
or transients -- to care about the identity of fellow shareholders. This “birds 
of a feather” effect is visible among the companies held by leading QSs, such 






Cantillon Capital  




Lone Pine Capital 
Southeastern  
Temasek Holdings 
Table III.9: QSs Attracting QSs 
Companies tap into the broader QS ecosystem, where members tend 
to know one another or know of one another. Resulting network effects 
reinforce advantages of a high-density QS base of patient and knowledgeable 
shareholders. 
The QS cohort may also help brand a company. After all, consumer 
brands become competitive advantages when they assure that consumers 
recognize product features. A corporate reputation for attracting QSs is a 
competitive advantage when a company repeatedly commits to the values 
patient focused shareholders appreciate, including long-term performance 
metrics and rational capital allocation policies.  
 
 3. Annual Letters to Shareholders.239 Investors ask what 
resources to consult when hunting for great companies.  Good advice is to 
read the shareholder letter the company sends out every year.  Next to the 
financial figures, it is perhaps the most important and accessible source of 
valuable information.  These communications reveal a lot about a company 
and its CEO. Some obfuscate, others patronize, and many appear to be 
ghostwritten, but the best ones share business insights that help readers 
understand a company.   
 Numerous surveys of shareholder letters rank them according to 
various indicators of quality, some statistical and some judgmental. Despite 
such variety, the same names appear often in both published lists and private 
polls—invariably starting with Buffett—and they tend to attract a high level 
 
239 This sub-section is adapted from Cunningham’s Quality Investing columns in 
MarketWatch of November 4, 2020. 
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of QSs. One expert on corporate shareholder letters, Laura Rittenhouse, in a 
recent annual ranking, designated the top 25 by her measures, the vast 




















Table III.10: Shareholder Letters and QS Density 
4. Long-Tenured CEOs.241 Companies boasting the longest tenured 
CEOs also tend to attract QSs. In recent years, the average CEO tenure of 
large U.S. public companies has risen to ten years from seven (the average 
varies year-to-year and across statistical methods).242 Many CEOs create 
greatest value during the “golden” years 11- to 15, when knowledge and 
experience may be optimal.243 Some experts suggest 10 years may be ideal 
for most: long enough to contribute a lot, but short enough to avoid 
complacency.244 
The QSI identified CEOs with tenures of at least 10 years as of the 
beginning of 2020 from the QSDR. Of the 100 companies making the cut, 
one-fourth of the long-tenured CEOs ranked in the top decile for attracting 
QSs, one-half in the top quarter, and almost all (85) ranked in the top half.  
In other words, long-tenured CEOs are associated with high-quality 
shareholders.   
The longevity/quality correlation is particularly robust for 
companies with a tradition of long CEO tenures — one long-serving CEO 
followed by one or more others.  Leading examples: EcoLab has had seven 
CEOs in its 99-year history; Emerson Electric has had three CEOs over the 
past 66 years; and Amphenol whose current and prior CEO together served 
25 years (Richard Norwitt and Martin Loeffler).   
 
240 See Rittenhouse Rankings Press Release, Companies Excelling in Rittenhouse Candor 
Analytics™ Substantially Outperform the Market in 2016 (December 13, 2016). The 
assertion in the text is based on comparing the listing in Rittenhouse Rankings to the QS 
density rankings contained in QS Density Ranking, described in Section II. 
241 This sub-section is adapted from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Long-Tenured 
CEOs Can Take a Business from Good to Great — and these Companies Have Them, 
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/long-tenured-ceos-
can-take-a-business-from-good-to-great-and-these-companies-have-them-
11618380952?mod=quality-investing. 
242 Chip Cutter, New Thinking Emerges on Optimal Tenure for a CEO, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL 4-5 (February 3, 2020). 
243 See James M. Citrin et al. The CEO Life Cycle, HARV. BUS. REV. (2019), available at 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/hbr-ceo-
lifecycle/hbr_ceo_lifecycle_spencerstuart.pdf.  
244 See, e.g., Cutter, supra note 242. 
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CEOs come and go for many reasons — from retirement or better 
job opportunities to ouster due to subpar performance or a bad business 
model.  But it’s hard to stick around without sustained long-term 
performance — and a supportive shareholder base. What seems to unite this 
cohort of long tenures with high QS density is a shared appreciation for long-
term value creation: the CEO has a long-term vision for success and QSs are 
prepared to see it through with the company.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Quality Shareholders Initiative builds on impressive research 
into shareholder demographics and behavior. Continued probing of this 
cohort will be increasingly valuable as U.S. shareholders exercise their 
voting power on the increasingly important topics facing them, whether firm-
specific mergers and board elections to broader social topics of diversity and 
climate change.  Further research opportunities in this area are vast. 
 For instance, it is possible that not all QSs behave in a 
similar way.  Might it be that there are two different kinds of QS?  Might 
some exercise their position for positive corporate good while others do so 
to extract private gain?  Skimming the lists of top and bottom performers 
with high QS density, what is the exact makeup and behavior of this 
cohort?  Consider inside ownership by a single executive and his/her family 
versus other forms of QSs such as insurance companies or mutual funds. In 
other words, not all long-term high conviction (“LTHC”) shareholders are 
QSs.   
 Some LTHC’s exert influence or control to benefit themselves at the 
expense of other shareholders. Research could examine the effects of high 
levels of inside ownership or the presence of controlling shareholders on 
both relative QS density and relative corporate performance. If so, under the 
QS rubric, the designation of QS would be retained for the symbiont portion 
of the LTHC quadrant, while calling out the parasitic portion of the quadrant 
and specifically excluding them. (Consider it the inverse of the “indexer and 
closet indexer” to be the “true QS and the phantom QS”.) 
 In addition, further tools and techniques can be refined to deal with 
some of the definitional challenges of Quality Shareholders. Despite taking 
care to delineate a range of metrics probing conviction, gaps may remain—
for instance, concentration is almost certainly an imprecise measure of 
conviction. Consider two reciprocal examples of the problem from real 
world settings.  
First, a mutual fund family might seed a dozen funds, each heavily 
concentrated (say 5-10 stocks); a few years on, some of these naturally 
outperform without effort and fund markets these to attract AUM. This might 
pass most statistical definitions for the conviction aspect of QS, but it is the 
fund family’s behavior is inconsistent with the philosophy or reasons for 
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empowering certain shareholders. Such strategies could even be used as a 
subterfuge to game the system.   
Empirical research could continue to refine the definitions or 
develop or other tools to distinguish genuine QS from such phantom QS. 
Policy and practice research could do so by drafting language for charter 
provisions that express the purpose of QS empowerment, defines terms 
accordingly.  Language would then put the burden of persuasion on the 
shareholder wishing to exercise associated rights to prove eligibility to the 
corporation’s satisfaction, that it is a genuine QS rather than a strategic 
artifact or subterfuge.  
For the reciprocal case, some institutional investors employ high 
conviction managers who would be QSs but also impose limits on permissive 
positions. Forced sales can result to reduce average holding periods or 
concentration thresholds, though not the manager’s conviction. Such effects 
might disqualify such shareholders from exercising QS rights, though they 
may be expected to exercise those rights more suitably than fellow 
shareholders who met the numerical QS thresholds.  For theory, this is less 
worrisome in a sense because they almost entirely ceased to be shareholders 
for whatever reason; for practice, research might investigate whether 
corporations offering additional rights in such settings might, as a matter of 
theory or practice, induce such funds to alter their restrictions. 
Further research could contract the scope to consider whether 
particular industries or segments attract QSs or expand the scope to consider 
the shareholder demographics in other leading industrial countries, such as 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.   
Research into the policies and practices that may attract or repel different 
shareholder types remains of great ongoing interest. 
 For instance, we are investigating the correlation between 
QS density and various measures of competitive advantage and of insider 
share ownership. Similarly, refinements can be made in the scope of the 
definition of QS. For instance, we are examining the degree to which various 
shareholders vote on corporate resolutions based on their own independent 
judgment as compared with reliance upon the recommendations of 
institutional investor proxy advisers such as ISS or Glass Lewis.  
 Performance results and implications warrant continued 
examination. Our initial research is the product of hindsight. A more 
convincing test would be longitudinal. A research proposal that Cunningham 
and the Initiative aim to implement: construct a portfolio of high QS density 
investments, chosen ex ante, with performance results to be isolated and 
reported five years hence.  
In constructing such a portfolio, in addition to fundamental analysis, 
it is worth trying to determine whether any of the various levers noted earlier 
are more (or less) frequently used by the top (and bottom) performers. If so, 
portfolio design could be weighted in favor of companies applying such 
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levers. The QSI respectfully encourages and welcomes further research into 
this topic likely to be of increasing importance. 
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 The following abstract summarizes the various correlation data 
discussed at various points throughout the Article.  The left column lists the 
practice or policy discussed and the right column indicates where in the 
Article the related data is discussed in context. Statistics-wise, the first 
column gives the number of observations in the respective correlation test, 
followed by the number and percent, respectively, of such observations that 
were within the top 10%, top 25%, and top 50% of the QSDR.  
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QSDR   
















Race  9 
 
 1 8 9 
 





Voting   5 
 
 0 0 5 
 
0% 0% 100% n.196 
 Branding  36 
 
 13 27 35 
 
36% 75% 97% 
n.238: 
TIII.8 
 Trust  49 
 
 13 33 45 
 
26% 67% 90% n. 155 
 Moat  202 
 
 65 127 180 
 
32% 62% 87% 
n.237; 
TIII.7 
 Split-Chair  216 
 
 37 92 184 
 
16% 40% 85% n.166 
 Chair-CEO  234 
 
 66 132 197 
 
28% 57% 84% n.166 
 Drucker  141 
 
 39 76 119 
 
28% 54% 84% n.91 
 Bus. R. Table  135 
 
 34 74 109 
 
25% 55% 81% n.92 
 ESG—Barron’s  47 
 
 10 24 38 
 
20% 50% 80% n.107 
 ESG--IBD  46 
 
 11 23 38 
 
23% 50% 83% n.107 
 
Capital 
Allocation  140 
 
 37 79 105 
 





Women  133 
 
 19 54 92 
 
15% 40% 70% 
n.226; 
TIII.4 
 Dual Class  135 
 
 15 41 86 
 
11% 30% 64% n. 186 
 Uni/Class Board   
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